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Transatlantic partnerships are becoming integral to the success of modern-day aerospace 
programs.  NASA and the European Space Agency have cooperated for decades on such 
programs.  As with all such collaboration between nations, conflicts have and continue to arise 
between the U.S. and Europe concerning joint aerospace initiatives. This thesis investigates the 
hypothesis that nationalism has been the major driver within ESA, as well as between ESA and 
NASA, that hampers multinational cooperation; this thesis will also look to international space 
visions and the notion of joint space exploration as a partnership, not a competition.  
Additionally, multiple case studies of space cooperation between the European Union and the 
U.S. are analyzed, as well as what this could mean for future partnerships. This thesis concludes 
that cooperation within ESA’s member states is hampered by nationalism; however, as a 
multinational organization, ESA rarely allows nationalism to interfere with international 
cooperation in space.  Though NASA has participated in a range of successful international 
programs, it has allowed periodic shows of nationalistic actions to hamper some of these 
projects.  The author recommends that future space policy allow for more international 
cooperation, taking heed of lessons learned from past programs. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Transatlantic partnerships are quickly becoming integral to the success of modern-day 
aerospace programs.  The United States (U.S.) and Europe have cooperated for decades on 
numerous aviation programs. Such programs grew out of security cooperation in the 1950s and 
1960s, but their character changed as the nature of the transatlantic relationship matured.  In the 
early 1980s, joint U.S.-European cooperation resulted in the widespread North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) use of the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS). At the turn of the century, such joint projects include the Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF) and possibly the KC-X tanker replacement for the aging USAF tanker fleet.  This 
transatlantic partnership extends beyond aviation to include space exploration as well.  As far 
back as 1973, the U.S.’s National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) joined with the 
European Space Research Organization (ESRO) to create Spacelab, a modular scientific 
laboratory flown on the space shuttle.1  Since then, the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
NASA have partnered on numerous programs including Ulysses, an initiative to study the space 
above the poles of the sun, and the International Space Station (ISS).   
As with all such collaboration between nations about technology, conflicts have and 
continue to arise between the U.S. and Europe concerning joint aerospace initiatives.  The most 
controversial example in the aviation industry has recently been the KC-X tanker bid, which in 
2008 was awarded to Northrop Grumman and the European Aeronautic Defense and Space 
Company (EADS), but was being contested by Boeing as this thesis was being written in the fall 
of 2008.  In the space exploration arena, the ISS has also proven rather controversial within 
transatlantic relations.  The U.S. announced in June 2005 that it would pull out of the ISS project 
by the end of 2015.  That announcement set off bickering between ISS funding nations within 
Europe about when to close the ISS, despite the fact that it had not yet been completed.2  These 
are just two examples of the conflict experienced by transatlantic partners joining to further 
                                                 1 “History of the European Space Agency,” European Space Agency (2000-2008), 
http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/About_ESA/SEM7VFEVL2F_0.html (accessed 1 October 2008). 
2 “Space Station Partners Bicker Over Closure Date,” Agence France-Presse, 26 September 2007, 
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gEDs2HT4Mza-aoefdTjPWQzrSsvg (accessed 1 October 2008). 
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space advancement, as well as their respective interests. This author is professionally concerned 
with these issues as a flight test engineer in the USAF and also as a scholar of U.S.-European 
security affairs.  This thesis investigates multiple case studies of space cooperation between the 
European Union (EU) and the U.S., as well as what this could mean for future partnerships.  
Included in this analysis will be the politics of space in a multinational context, as well as the 
potential conflicts between multinational cooperation and nationalism.  This thesis investigates 
the hypothesis that nationalism has been the major driver within ESA, as well as between ESA 
and NASA, that hampers multinational cooperation.  In its conclusion, it will outline a set of 
policy recommendations on how the U.S. and its European partners might reduce these tensions 
in the future.  
B. IMPORTANCE  
Space power represents a vital aspect of U.S. security policy and defense strategy. The 
most recent U.S. National Space Policy, which was approved on 31 August 2006, states that “in 
order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national 
security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.”3  To 
achieve this, the policy of this government lays out seven principles, among which is that “the 
United States will seek to cooperate with other nations in the peaceful use of outer space to 
extend the benefits of space, enhance space exploration, and to protect and promote freedom 
around the world.”4  Along these lines, one of the seven fundamental goals of the renewed policy 
is to “encourage international cooperation with foreign nations and/or consortia on space 
activities that are of mutual benefit and that further the peaceful exploration and use of space, as 
well as to advance national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives.”5   
At the same time, the 1990s and the present decade have seen episodes of political 
acrimony across the Atlantic, which were anything but helpful to the declared ends of U.S. 
policy.  One also knows that, despite the solemn and laudable writs of such policy, economic 
nationalism, as well as the special interests that are normal in pluralistic societies, complicate 
                                                 3 Office of Technology and Space Policy,“U.S. National Space Policy,” August 2006, 
http://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default-file/Unclassified%20National%20Space%20Policy%20—%20FINAL.pdf 





such policy.  With the resurgence of the Russian space program in addition to the rise of the 
Chinese space program, transatlantic space cooperation is as important now as it has ever been.  
This thesis will look to international space visions and the notion of joint space exploration as a 
partnership, not a competition, as well as consider the conditions under which this might be 
possible.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that nationalism has been the major driver within 
ESA, as well as between ESA and NASA, that hampers multinational cooperation.  As 
mentioned previously, conflicts have and continue to arise between the U.S. and Europe 
concerning joint space initiatives.  In March of 2005, British Aerospace Systems (BAE) Chief 
Executive Officer Michael Turner threatened to back out of the JSF program if it did not receive 
the technology transfer rights that BAE requested.6  In March 2008, U.S. aerospace giant Boeing 
protested when the Northrop Grumman/EADS team was awarded the USAF’s contract for 
replacement aerial refuelers.7  While the U.S. and Europe have a notion of partnership, not 
competition, it is such bidding wars that turn a friendly relationship into an adversarial one.  
Adversarial relationships are also due to growing commercial turbulence, as well as greater 
interdependence and collaboration in a globalized world. 
As concerns space systems, the aforementioned ISS problem is at the forefront.  In 2005, 
NASA alluded to intentions to leave the ISS by 2015; this announcement resulted in conflict 
between NASA and ESA, as well as within ESA itself. Yet another source of contention was the 
Ulysses program, which was an ESA-produced spacecraft launched aboard a NASA space 
shuttle.  This program dealt with almost seven years of delays from both sides before being 
launched.  Galileo, Europe’s precision navigation system that will be compatible with the U.S.’s 
                                                 6 Lisa Troshinsky, “No Tech Transfer, No JSF Cooperation, BAE Chief Warns,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 23 March 2005, 
https://npsbart.nps.edu/+CSCO+00756767633A2F2F6A6A6A2E6E69766E677662616A7272782E70627A++/aw/ge
neric/story_generic.jsp?channel=aerospacedaily&id=news/JSFB_103235.xml (available with account access only; 
accessed 1 October 2008). 
7 Amy Butler and David Fulghum, “Boeing Leaning Toward Not Rebidding KC-X,” Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 11 August 2008, 
https://npsbart.nps.edu/+CSCO+00756767633A2F2F6A6A6A2E6E69766E677662616A7272782E70627A++/aw/ge
neric/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/BOEING081108.xml (available with account access only; 
accessed 1 October 2008). 
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Global Positioning System (GPS) and Russia’s Global'naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya 
Sistema (GLONASS), is another program that has seen its share of conflict not only between 
ESA and NASA, but between ESA and Russia, as well as within ESA itself.   
Another joint effort was the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium 
(INTELSAT) in the 1960s and 1970s.  Much to the dismay of Europeans, the U.S. held a 
majority (61%) of the shares, which led to a greater number of INTELSAT contracts awarded to 
the Communication Satellite Corporation (COMSAT), a U.S.-controlled company in exchange 
for use of U.S. technology.8  To protect U.S. interests, INTELSAT resisted launching European 
commercial satellites, for instance, Symphonie.  As a result of this, Europe became determined to 
achieve independence by developing its own launcher.9 
The Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA) is another example of 
transatlantic cooperation in space.  SOFIA is a joint astronomy project between NASA and the 
German Aerospace Center.10  According to Johnson-Freese, “with the program 85 percent 
complete, and more than $500 million in tax-payer dollars invested in it—plus another $100 
million from Germany—U.S. funding was cut for fiscal year 2007, mere months before the first 
scheduled test flight.”11  While this certainly did not strengthen U.S.-European cooperation in 
space, the program did survive and is in operation as of this writing.  
When one looks to the future, an observer who is less invested of the particular and 
special interests of commercial firms in the narrow sense can only reinforce the notion that the 
transatlantic relationship must strengthen in order for both sides to prosper. This statement is true 
not only for the future of the JSF, USAF tanker replacement, and the ISS, but it is also true for 
future missions to the Moon and Mars.  With NASA’s planned retirement of the shuttle, both 
sides must be committed to cooperation in order to keep a human presence in space.  But how 
can this commitment to knowledge and the perfection of science and technology be squared with 
competition in the more rancorous political, economical, and industrial world?  This thesis seeks 
to analyze the knotted problems of transatlantic relations and technology in search of answers.    
                                                 8 Kazuto Suzuki, Policy Logistics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2003), 56. 
9 Ibid., 62. 




D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A rich, complex literature exists concerning the transatlantic relations in aerospace 
endeavors.  One of the main works to be analyzed is Army Captain David R. Perry’s Master’s 
Thesis, “Multi-National Cooperation in Space Operations;”12 in addition, case studies to be 
researched include INTELSAT, the Ulysses mission, SOFIA, Galileo, and the ISS and future 
missions to the Moon and Mars.  Both U.S. and European space policies will provide 
background regarding (and a basis for) transatlantic cooperation.  In addition, books such as Joan 
Johnson-Freese’s Space as a Strategic Asset,13 Phillip Lawrence and Derek Braddon’s Strategic 
Issues in European Aerospace,14 Daphne Burleson’s Space Programs Outside the United 
States,15 Mark Lorell et al.’s Going Global?16, and James Clay Moltz’s The Politics of Space 
Security17 will be referenced.  Also, journals such as Space Policy, Space News, Astro-politics, 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, and the ESA Bulletin will be utilized.  This thesis will also 
draw upon numerous internet sources, such as the NASA and ESA official Web pages, as well as 
public documents, such as Reports to Congress (CRS) and European Policy Papers written by 
authors such as Carl Behrens, Paul Belkin, Johan Lembke, Iraklis Oikonomou, and Marcia 
Smith.   
In his Master’s thesis, CPT Perry concludes that “politics has a tremendous effect on 
multinational endeavors,”18 citing recent ISS issues.  On the subject of multinational cooperation, 
he concludes that any partnership, be it space- or Earth-based, needs to have a full understanding 
of all the players involved and stresses the importance of liaisons.19  Perry’s thesis focuses on the 
ISS and Apollo-Soyuz missions; however, joint NASA-ESA endeavors are not mentioned.  This 
                                                 12 David R. Perry, Captain, US Army, “Multi-National Cooperation in Space Operations,” M.S. Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2005. 
13 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset. 
14 Phillip Lawrence and Derek Braddon, Strategic Issues in European Aerospace (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing, 1999). 
15 Daphne Burleson, Space Programs Outside the United States (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 
Publishers, 2005). 
16 Mark A. Lorell, Julia Lowell, Richard M. Moore, Victoria Greenfield, and Katia Vlachos, Going Global: US 
Government Policy and the Defense Aerospace Industry (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Publishing, 2007). 
17 James Clay Moltz, The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 
18 Perry, 30. 
19 Ibid., 31. 
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thesis will fill the gaps in this area to include the Ulysses and Galileo programs among others, 
such as future uses of ESA’s Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV). 
Lawrence and Braddon’s Strategic Issues in European Aerospace tackles many topics 
including “The European Response to Globalisation”20 and “The Role of the EU as a Catalyser 
for the Integration of the Aerospace Industry in Europe.”21  These topics point out that Europe 
cannot keep pace with the U.S.’s aerospace industry without strong financial support, as well as 
multinational cooperation within Europe.  In addition, they frankly state, “if we [Europe] are not 
cohesive, acting together, there is a good chance that the European aerospace industry will be 
severely weakened in the global marketplace.”22  This book will serve as the basis for 
researching the strategic issues that Europe faces in the aerospace industry; this thesis will 
extrapolate from these strategic issues and determine if/how multinational cooperation within 
Europe and between Europe and the U.S. can propel both the U.S. and Europe further toward the 
top of the increasingly globalized aerospace industry. 
Yet another book that researches the globalization of the aerospace industry, Lorell, et 
al.’s Going Global, finds that as the U.S. collaborates with one country’s firm, it increases the 
likelihood of collaboration with other countries’ firms.  This means that “it is increasingly 
unrealistic for U.S. government policy makers and industry leaders to think in terms of bilateral 
collaborative relationships between the United States and specific European or other foreign 
countries.”23  In addition, the authors conclude that a balance must be struck between 
competition and cooperation with Europe, as well as calling for increased research in the 
industrial, political, and military environments of Europe.24  This author intends the thesis to 
cover these areas. 
Suzuki’s Policy Logics and Institutions of European Space Collaboration includes a 
study of INTELSAT.  As previously mentioned, the U.S. had the majority of satellite contracts; 
Suzuki notes that “the lack of technological capability and expertise for application satellites 
                                                 20 Lawrence and Braddon, 91. 
21 Ibid., 99. 
22 Ibid., 97, 99. 
23 Lorell et al., 187. 
24 Ibid., 191. 
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seriously disadvantaged the position of European governments in the Intelsat negotiations, and 
therefore, they were urged to form a group under CETS [Conférence Européenne des 
Télécommunications par Satellite].”25  He goes to report that the Europeans were resigned to rely 
on the U.S. to launch their telecommunications satellites; however, the U.S. agreed to allow the 
usage of their launcher technology if and only if it was not used to improve communication 
satellite capability (among other stipulations).26  This clearly was not the solution the Europeans 
were seeking and led to competition with the U.S. instead of cooperation.  Johnson-Freese also 
investigates the INTELSAT case and notes that the U.S.’s decision not to launch European 
satellites was purely economic.27  In her book, she states that “the idea of the United States 
imposing such restrictions on Europe was the ammunition France needed to convince the other 
European spacefaring nations that Europe needed its own launch capability.  The result was the 
Ariane launcher.”28  These two authors highlight how nationalism hindered U.S.-European space 
cooperation; this thesis will draw upon this case to support the hypothesis that nationalism plays 
a role in hampering multinational space cooperation.   
Johnson-Freese also investigates the SOFIA project, a joint project between NASA and 
the German Aerospace Center.   NASA cut the program in order to reroute money to the Space 
Shuttle and the ISS.  In June 2006, however, Germany persuaded NASA to take another look at 
the funding for the program, which eventually proceeded.29  Again, this thesis will investigate 
the role of nationalism in these negotiations. 
In August 2006, President Bush authorized an updated national space policy that governs 
the conduct of U.S. space activity.  Within this policy are seven principles and seven 
fundamental goals designed to keep the U.S. at the forefront of space exploration.  In addition to 
the aforementioned principle and goal pertaining to international cooperation, it stated: 
The United States is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by all 
nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with 
this principle, ‘peaceful purposes’ allow U.S. defense and intelligence-related 
                                                 25 Suzuki, 56. 
26 Ibid., 62. 
27 Johnson-Freese, Space as a Strategic Asset, 46. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 78-79. 
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activities in pursuit of national interests; also the United States considers space 
capabilities—including the ground and space segments and supporting links—
vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: 
preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter 
others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do 
so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to 
interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities 
hostile to U.S. national interests.30   
An additional goal includes “strengthen[ing] the nation’s space leadership and ensure[ing] that 
space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and 
foreign policy objectives.”31 
The updated space policy expresses that the U.S. is committed to international 
cooperation in numerous areas of space exploration from Earth observation to the minimization 
of orbital debris.  The policy includes an International Cooperation section that outlines not only 
transatlantic partnerships, but worldwide partnerships, as well:  
The United States Government will pursue, as appropriate, and consistent with 
U.S. national security interests, international cooperation with foreign nations 
and/or consortia on space activities that are of mutual benefit and that further the 
peaceful exploration and use of space, as well as to advance national security, 
homeland security, and foreign policy objectives.  Areas for potential 
international cooperation include, but are not limited to: space exploration; 
providing space surveillance information consistent with security requirements 
and U.S. national security and foreign policy interests; [and] developing and 
operating Earth-observation-systems.32  
Across the Atlantic, a European space policy was not agreed upon and implemented until 
2007.  This policy unified “the approach of the ESA with those of the individual European Union 
member states.  Jointly drafted by the European Commission and ESA’s Director General, Jean-
Jacques Dordain, it creates for the first time a common political framework for space activities in 
Europe.”33  The strategic mission of the European space policy was also outlined and “based on  
 
                                                 30 Office of Science and Technology Policy, Presidential Decision Directive, “U.S. National Space Policy.” 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33 “History of the European Space Agency,” European Space Agency. 
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the peaceful exploitation of Outer Space by all states.”34   The European space policy also 
outlines how European countries will work together to implement the policy and subsequent 
goals.  The members will:  
Develop and exploit space applications serving Europe's public policy objectives 
and the needs of European enterprises and citizens … to meet Europe's security 
and defence needs as regards space; to ensure a strong and competitive space 
industry…; to secure unrestricted access to new and critical technologies, systems 
and capabilities in order to ensure independent European space applications.  To 
achieve this strategic mission will require the [European Union] EU, ESA and 
their Member States to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their space 
activities by … developing a joint international relations strategy in space.35 
This space policy clearly outlines the need (and the requirement) for collaborative efforts.  
The EU as a whole (not just the European Commission [EC]) must support and work with ESA 
in order to achieve international status in space science, as well as to better the lives of the 
people of Europe.  By agreeing to this policy, ESA agrees to oversight by the EC, and the EC 
agrees to provide funding to ESA so that it can accomplish the EU’s goals in space.  According 
to the EC, this policy demonstrates the EU’s ability to lead in areas of strategic importance.   
Both the U.S. and European space policies show a commitment to multinational 
cooperation for the betterment of space exploration.  The largest space-based cooperation project 
is the ISS.  ESA is not only cooperating within its member-state construct and with the EC, but it 
is also part of the largest international space exploration endeavor ever undertaken.  An initial 
member of the ISS, ESA continues to fund and contribute to the ISS through station modules and 
astronaut presence.  Long-time space policy expert John Logsdon has written numerous 
publications concerning the ISS.  He notes that in 1984, U.S. President Reagan commissioned 
NASA “to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it within the decade. … NASA 
will invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build prosperity, and expand  
 
                                                 34 “History of the European Space Agency,” European Space Agency. 




(accessed 14 October 2008). 
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freedom for all who share our goals.”36  Europe accepted the invitation in 1985 implying that a 
significant share of Europe’s “space budgets over the coming decade would have to be channeled 
into a partnership with the United States.”37 
Such a large undertaking does not come without its disagreements, which were not only 
seen internationally, but within ESA, as well.  During the year from invitation to acceptance, 
Europe was divided on whether or not to join such a venture.  As noted by Logsdon, “political-
level discussions among the leading European countries—particularly France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Italy—were leading to agreement on how those elements could be 
combined in an acceptable fashion.”38   The biggest disagreement was split three ways: French 
desire for better launch vehicles and European autonomy, German and Italian desire for human 
spaceflight, and British desire for ESA to take on smaller, exploration-type projects.39  After a 
year of discussions between the member states, ESA accepted President Reagan’s invitation to 
join in the ISS.   
Since its agreement to join in the ISS endeavor, ESA has contributed the Columbus 
laboratory, as well as two mission control centers, one for the operation of the Columbus 
laboratory and one for Europe’s Automated Transfer Vehicle.   These control centers are located 
at the German Space Operations Center near Munich, Germany, and French Space Agency in 
Toulouse, France, respectively. 
Fast forward twenty years to the U.S.’s announcement that it will leave the ISS by the 
end of 2015.  That announcement set off bickering between ISS funding nations about when to 
close the ISS, despite the fact that it had not yet been completed.  NASA announced that it would 
utilize the space station no longer than five years after completion, Russia is pushing for a longer 
life, and ESA acknowledges that it cannot pick up NASA’s share after NASA’s departure from 
the ISS.  In light of that, ESA chief Jean-Jacques Dordain stated at an astronautics congress in 
Hyderabad, India, that “If NASA is staying, we are ready to follow. If NASA is quitting, I shall 
                                                 36 John Logsdon, Together in Orbit: The Origins of the International Space Station (Washington, DC: The 
George Washington University, 1999), 1. 
37 Ibid., 26.  




not propose to ESA to pay part of the cost that NASA is covering today.”40  If the U.S. departs 
the ISS in 2015, ESA must decide how to proceed.  Such a decision is sure to cause controversy 
not only within the ESA itself, but also between the ESA and the EC, as well as ESA and other 
international partners. 
Other programs have witnessed conflict, as well, including Galileo and Ulysses.  The 
Galileo program began in the late 1990s, and disagreements on funding began right away.  In a 
European Policy Paper for the Center for West European Studies, “Transport Commissioner 
Loyola de Palacio argued that the EU Transport Council would be crucial for the future of 
Galileo.”41  Despite this warning, the Transport Council postponed a commitment to the 
development of Galileo.  However, the European Commission continued to push for an 
agreement between the EU Council and the European Parliament by May of 2001.42  Conflict 
also existed within the EU member countries, not just within the EU political structure.  France, 
Italy, Norway, Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland felt that the construct and political drivers of 
Galileo fell under the umbrella of the EU.  Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
(UK) subscribed to a more commercial argument and pushed for immediate development.43  In 
2007, European finance ministers disagreed on funding for satellite navigation, putting Galileo in 
a holding pattern.  Previously, the mission had been boosted when funds were diverted from the 
agricultural sector to the ESA’s satellite navigation budget.  Germany, however, wanted to see 
money specifically allotted for ESA to pay for the Galileo program.  However, according to 
Portuguese Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira Dos Santos, “Germany put forward that point of 
view, but was alone in doing so.  There was no support from the other member states.”44   
The Ulysses spacecraft, built in Europe and launched aboard a NASA shuttle in 1990, 
was the first spacecraft to fly over the poles of the sun.45  Ulysses endured almost a decade of 
delay in part due to financial cutbacks in the early 1980s on the NASA side of the partnership.  
                                                 40 “Space Station Partners Bicker Over Closure Date,” Agence France-Presse, 26 September 2007. 
41 Johan Lembke, The Politics of Galileo, European Policy Paper No 7 (April 2001), 8. 
42 Ibid., 9. 
43 Ibid., 11. 
44 “EU Agrees to Disagree,” The European Weekly, 17 November 2007, 
http://www.neurope.eu/articles/79861.php (accessed 14 October 2008).  
45 Burleson, 79. 
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ESA continued with the mission, however, and was prepared to launch in 1986.  Due to the 
Challenger disaster, however, the launch was further delayed until 1990.46 
Looking to the future, there are numerous space programs affected by the U.S.-Europe 
transatlantic relationship.  The ISS will continue to be a point of contention; however, ESA’s 
ATV could serve as the bridge between ESA and NASA by allowing for cooperation and 
reducing both agencies’ reliance on Russia to transfer cargo and potentially crews to and from 
the ISS.  The ATV, however, is a currently a cargo ship only.  In order to use the ATV to 
transport crews, it would have to be man-rated, which would incur additional costs not only to 
ESA, but potentially to NASA, as well, assuming ESA allows NASA to utilize the spacecraft.  
Future missions to the Moon and Mars will also require transatlantic cooperation including the 
Constellation Project, which encompasses the vehicles required for such endeavors.   
This thesis will research nationalism conflicts within ESA, as well as between ESA and 
NASA.  These drivers could include economic self interests, respective national security, and/or 
nationalism.  This thesis investigates the hypothesis that nationalism has been the major point of 
contention within ESA, as well as between ESA and NASA, that hampers multinational 
cooperation.  The findings will be contrasted with the growing pressures and need for 
international cooperation and globalization in order to further space exploration. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The methodology for conducting this project are historical and comparative case studies 
of joint space exploration projects undertaken by the U.S. and Europe.  For the analysis, NASA 
and ESA (as well as its member states and their respective space agencies) will be evaluated.  In 
addition to the aforementioned sources of books, journals, and policy papers, interviews will be 
conducted with NASA officials, as well as experts in the field of space security.    
In seeking answers to the viability of continuing transatlantic relations pertaining to space 
cooperation, a study of the history of multinational agreements in space exploration will offer 
insight into the challenges the U.S. and Europe will face as they look to the future of space.  In 
addition, two of the three the levels of analysis common to international relations will serve as an 
                                                 46 “Ulysses Overview,” European Space Agency, 2000-2008, 
http://www.esa.int/esaSC/120395_index_0_m.html (accessed 15 October 2008). 
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outline for the methodology of this research.  The international level will look at the distribution 
of power, economic conditions, and interdependence of one country on another, while the state 
level, will research the country’s regime type, politics, and organizational theory, focusing on 
nationalism.  These levels will be studied as they apply to the aforementioned case studies and 
historical references.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II examines why states cooperate 
in high-tech ventures including space and will include specific factors relevant to the 
transatlantic relationship.  Chapter III discusses the history of U.S.-European space cooperation 
and investigates projects within this construct.  Chapter IV outlines current and emerging issues 
affected by the transatlantic cooperation, and finally, Chapter V concludes this thesis and offers 
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II. SPACE COOPERATION 
A. WHY NATION-STATES COOPERATE IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY VENTURES 
Nation-states cooperate in high-technology ventures for such varied reasons as cost 
savings, a desire to increase the rate of technological research and development, risk sharing, and 
technology sharing and transfer, as well as strategic needs of alliance cohesion.  Cooperation in 
these ventures also results in the generation of new products, processes, and services.  As noted 
in a 2005 report to the United States (U.S.) Congress, “collaborative ventures are intended to 
accommodate the strengths and responsibilities of all sectors involved in innovation and 
technology development.”47  In 2008, officials in the White House noted that “the U.S.-European 
commercial relationship is the engine of the world economy.”48  To this end, the U.S. has joined 
with European countries to pursue advanced technology ventures in many areas.  Academic, 
commercial, and military cooperation have resulted in noteworthy and diverse products including 
the structure of DNA, earthquake engineering,49 the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), and the 
International Space Station (ISS).   
Cost savings are a substantial benefit of cooperation in general, but especially in high-
technology ventures.  While an effort to cooperate with other nation-states may be more 
expensive in the short term (for example, extra travel, interpreters, different measurement 
systems, etc), such effort can be more cost effective in the long run.  For instance, the ISS would 
have been entirely too expensive for one nation-state to fund independently.  With the help of 
five cooperating nation-states (Canada, European nations under the veil of the European Space 
Agency (ESA), Japan, Russia, and the U.S.), the construction and utilization of the ISS was much 
more feasible, since spreading research and development across numerous participants 
subsidizes the overall cost.  Another example is the JSF; over $4.5B of the program have been 
                                                 47 Wendy H. Schacht,  Cooperative R&D: Federal Effort to Promote Industrial Competitiveness, CRS Report for 
Congress, IB89056, (2005). 
48 “Fact Sheet: The United States and The European Union: Working Together to Advance Freedom and 
Prosperity Around the World,” The White House (2008), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/06/20080610-6.html (accessed 8 December 2008).  
49 “U.S.-EU Cooperation in Science and Technology,” US Department of State (2005), 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/42549.htm (accessed 8 December 2008). 
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funded through international cooperation.50  Though the U.S. could have produced the JSF 
without this funding, the technological advances may not have been developed as quickly. The 
sum of $4.5B may be a small portion of the overall cost of the JSF program; however, this 
funding and technology transfer from cooperating nation-states do have an overall positive 
impact the program.  
Another benefit of cooperation in high technology ventures is the sharing of risk and 
possibly the spreading of the penalty of associated failure.  The risk associated with a project 
may be too much for one nation-state (for example, the risk could outweigh any potential 
benefits), but if the risk is spread across many nations and institutions, the project is much more 
feasible and the risk is more manageable.  Again, an example of this is the ISS.  If the ISS or its 
individual components had failed, the cost and failure would have been spread through five 
space agencies instead of completely crippling one nation’s space agency.    
B. FACTORS AFFECTING U.S.-EUROPEAN COOPERATION 
Nationalism is an elusive term.  Many have attempted to define nationalism; however, it 
is more a state of concept rather than a word to be defined.   Kupchan notes that “in some parts 
of post communist Europe, nationalism is a critical source of cohesion, in others, a source of 
fragmentation and violence.”51  In National Identity, Anthony Smith defines national identity as 
“some sort of political community,”52 while Craig Calhoun adds that “nationalism is not only a 
matter of politics, but of cultural and personal identity,”53 as well.  While these are excellent 
definitions and ideas, nationalism cannot truly be defined since it is more about the variations in 
the ideas/concepts of a nation.  What is of benefit to this study is the idea of nationalists and how 
they shape the international relations of space cooperation as applied to the U.S. and Europe.  
Nationalistic particularism and parochial concerns of a national nature have been present in the 
area of space exploration since the beginning; for example, the space race of the 1950s and 
1960s was deeply rooted in the Soviet-U.S. conflict of the era which, in turn, was a successor to 
competition in the then high technology of aviation and maritime weapons of the early 20th 
                                                 50 “Program,” JSF (2008),  http://www.jsf.mil/program/prog_intl.htm (accessed 8 December 2008).  
51 Charles A. Kupchan, Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1995), ix. 
52 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno, NV: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 9. 
53 Craig J. Calhoun, Nationalism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 3. 
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century.  There was a tremendous amount of pride and prestige in the Soviet Union when Sputnik 
was launched in 1957.  The same can be said for the U.S. when Apollo 11 landed on the Moon in 
1969.  Had it not been for dictates of putative national and strategic interests fueling the space 
race, these feats may not have been accomplished for many, many years.   
According to Lieven, post-9/11, the U.S. reverted back to its old pattern of nationalism, 
which in turn “alienated the United States from some of its closest allies in Europe.”54  
Additionally, Lieven concludes that Europe has overcome its Eurocentric way of thinking and 
embraced the idea of international cooperation, as opposed to traditional nationalism.55  This, 
however, is not entirely accurate in the area of space cooperation, be it within ESA itself or 
between ESA and other nation-states.  This section will research nationalism in space 
cooperation and correlate the activities and policies of the U.S. and European governments, and 
their respective space agencies, to nationalism.   
1. U.S. National Interest, Nationalism, and Space 
In the 21st century, the U.S. is one of the world’s major space powers (along with Russia) 
if not the major space power.  How does this state of affairs fit within the international system of 
nation-states?  Following the space race with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, the U.S. surged 
ahead in the development of a reusable launch vehicle, space science research, and military 
support technology.  With the coming of the ISS, the U.S.’s National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) and Russia found themselves once again working together for the 
progression of space exploration.  In addition to Russia’s partnership, NASA has also partnered 
in many areas with ESA and many of its member states, the Japan Aerospace Exploration 
Agency (JAXA), and the Canadian Space Agency (CSA).  Though this policy is a multilateral 
endeavor, the pursuit of national interests, as well as outright nationalism as applied to industrial 
policy and space technology, plays a role in the politics and economics of the ISS.  With such 
accomplishments and rich heritage in space exploration, the creators of U.S. space policy and the 
space industry feel a great pride that plays a key role in the international relations of space 
cooperation.         
                                                 54 Anatol Lieven, America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism (New York, NY: Oxford 




a. Brief History 
The NASA of the early 21st century has a heritage that began in 1915 with the 
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), whose mission was to advance 
aeronautics research in its infancy and when aviation was scarcely a major issue of public policy 
in the new world.  In the wake of the Sputnik shock in 1958, NACA acquired the additional 
mission of space research and exploration and was renamed to NASA.  The agency’s progress 
accelerated at a rapid pace; NASA was able to put a man in space, orbit the earth, and eventually 
land man on the Moon in a span of only eight years (from May 1961 to July 1969).  
Unfortunately, following the initial Moon landings, NASA’s budget was drastically reduced in 
the difficult decade of the 1970s; this policy resulted in the cancellation of Apollo 18, 19, and 
20.56  In the years that followed the Apollo program, NASA turned its focus to space science 
programs, launching such probes as Mariner, Pioneer, and eventually, Voyager.  Skylab, the 
U.S.’s first experimental space station, was also launched in 1973, serving as the platform for 
nearly 300 scientific experiments.57   
NASA’s next great accomplishment came with the launching of the Space 
Transport System, better known as the Space Shuttle.  The Shuttle was first launched in 1981 and 
is scheduled to be retired in 2010.  There have been five orbiters to serve the U.S.: Columbia, 
Challenger, Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavor.  As of this writing, only three orbiters remain: in 
1986, the U.S. was faced with the loss of seven astronauts and the Challenger, which broke apart 
during launch; in 2003, another orbiter was lost when Columbia broke apart during re-entry, 
which also resulted in the loss of all seven crew members.  Despite these losses, the U.S. has 
continued to forge ahead with the ISS, with the first two modules of the station being launched in 
1998.  Today, the ISS consists of more than ten modules resulting from more than thirty 
construction flights, has been home to more than 167 astronauts/cosmonauts,58 and has been the  
 
 
                                                 56 Roger E. Bilstein, Orders of Magnitude: A History of the NACA and NASA, 1915-1990 (Washington, DC: 
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58 “Nations around the World Mark 10th Anniversary of International Space Station,” NASA (2008),  
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platform for hundreds of scientific experiments.  NASA continues to look to the future with 
plans for completing the space station, missions to the Moon and Mars, and a new program to 
accomplish this feat: Constellation.       
b. Goals, Projects, and Nationalism 
As previously mentioned, the most recent U.S. National Space Policy states that 
“in order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and to enhance the national 
security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space capabilities.”59  The 
2006 space policy greatly differs in one area from the previous policy in 1996; while still 
mentioning international cooperation in the 2006 policy, it focuses much more heavily on 
national security.  In that vein, the U.S. government has lain out seven principles to achieve the 
aforementioned goals; among these principles, the U.S. is committed to “the exploration and use 
of outer space by all nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity.”60  In 
addition, the principles call for the rejection of any claim over space by a nation and the 
deterrence of nations that may impede others from developing space capabilities.  In the realm of 
national defense, the principles call for the denial of space capabilities if a nation threatens U.S. 
interests.61  The U.S.’s unilateralism and nationalism are evident in these principles.  Along 
these lines, the following goals set forth by the space policy also have a nationalistic flavor in 
terms of both attitude and self-determination:  
                                                
Strengthen the nation’s space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are 
available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign 
policy objectives; enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to 
defend our interests there; enable a dynamic, globally competitive domestic 
commercial space sector in order to promote innovation, strengthen U.S. 
leadership, and protect national, homeland, and economic security; and enable a 
robust science and technology base supporting national security, homeland 
security, and civil space activities.62   
These goals all have a common thread: to protect the U.S. and its interests; to 
meet these goals, the U.S. has many programs in progress.  These programs include the Defense 






Support Program (DSP) (under United States Air Force [USAF] control), the Global Positioning 
System (GPS) constellation (under Department of Defense [DoD] control), the ISS (under NASA 
control), and many commercial space ventures.  DSP satellites protect the U.S. with their ability 
to detect missile launches and nuclear detonations.63  This capability will continue to exist for 
the U.S. as DSP is phased out and replaced by the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS).  The 
statement: “enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests 
there,”64 can be construed as having slight overtones of an anti-satellite system (ASAT).65  
While ASAT systems themselves are not banned, the test of such systems is proscribed via the 
Outer Space Treaty, which refers to the harmful contamination of space.66  Recently, however, 
the U.S. shot down a rogue satellite (U.S. 193) using a sea-launched missile.  While not a “test” 
of an ASAT system, this action clearly has important implications, which reconfirm the U.S.’s 
ability to shoot down a satellite.  Finally, in meeting these goals, the U.S. commercial sector 
continues to succeed at its goal of being globally competitive via advances in 
telecommunications, Earth mapping satellites, and commercial space launch ventures. 
Aside from the current space policy, nationalism can also be found in NASA 
projects.  The ISS provides an excellent example of U.S. nationalism in practice in terms of 
attitude and self-identity.  For instance, the original name of the ISS was Freedom.  As the 
number of partners increased, the name of the station continued to change (Alpha, then 
eventually ISS) and contracts were “lost” by the U.S. in favor of money and technology from 
cooperative partners.  On the economic side, the U.S. has put forth the largest sum of funding for 
the ISS, at a total of $40B by the end of 2008.67  To that end, the U.S. lays claim to a majority of 
the station regardless of the “international” nature of the program.  It is, after all, the 
                                                 63 Jeffrey T. Richelson, America’s Space Sentinels: DSP Satellites and National Security (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1999), vix, 40. 
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International Space Station, not the U.S. Owns Controlling Interest Station.  Another example of 
U.S. nationalism in space programs is the International Telecommunications Satellite 
Consortium (INTELSAT) program.  The Communication Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) was 
established via the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 and was U.S. government owned.  
When INTELSAT came online in 1964, COMSAT satellites were used.  As noted by Johnson-
Freese, the U.S. offered to “provide benefits to others in areas which did not negatively affect 
U.S. national interest as inducement for cooperation, while ensuring no technology transfer from 
the United States.”68  Thus the U.S. ensured its pivotal role in this international cooperation all 
the while keeping its technology close hold.  As previously mentioned, INTELSAT resisted 
launching European commercial satellites in order to maintain the lion’s share of the program,69 
yet another example of nationalism in play.   
Nationalism in space has been evident for decades, from INTELSAT in the 1960s 
to the present-day ISS.  Strong themes of nationalism can be found from the new U.S. National 
Space Policy to the means of achieving the goals set forth in the policy.  While nationalism is 
something that will continue to be a factor in space decisions, cooperation is obviously not out of 
the question.  The challenge is to understand the specific conditions under which it can be 
reduced successfully. 
2. U.S. Space Policy and Transatlantic Relations 
As previously mentioned, the most current (2006) U.S. National Space Policy focuses 
more on national security and less on international cooperation than the previous space policy 
(1996) had.  This change of policy is obvious not only from its content, but also from the fact 
that there are only two short paragraphs covering international cooperation and almost two entire 
pages on national security.  Regardless, the U.S. recognizes the value of international 
cooperation and still addresses such cooperation in the 2006 policy.  As such, one of the policy  
goals set forth is the encouragement of “international cooperation with foreign nations and/or 
consortia on space activities that are of mutual benefit and that further the peaceful exploration 
and use of space.”70 
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However, U.S. policy is very clear on its intention to pursue international cooperation if 
and only if it is consistent with national security interests.  The policy states that international 
cooperation could occur in space exploration, Earth observation, and “providing space 
surveillance information consistent with security requirements and U.S. national security and 
foreign policy interests.”71  The policy goes on to say that the U.S. will encourage the use of its 
systems by friends and allies.72  Almost the entire section on international cooperation is based 
on U.S. national security interests and the promotion of its own systems.   
The U.S.’s concern for national security is evident throughout the entire document.  One 
principle mentions that the U.S. supports the peaceful use of outer space by all nations; however, 
the next principle states that the U.S. “rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the 
United States to operate in and acquire data from space.”73  Note that the principle discusses the 
fundamental right of the United States, not all countries as mentioned in the previous principle.  
In addition, treaty obligations are not mentioned in the 2006 document, as was mentioned in 
1996.  Instead, the 2006 policy states that “arms control agreements or restrictions must not 
impair the rights of the United States to conduct research, development, testing, and operations 
or other activities in space for U.S. national interests.”74 
It is evident that nationalism (in the form of national security, attitude, self-identity, and 
self determination) is at the forefront of U.S. space policy and will be a major driver in 
international cooperation not only with Europe, but other nation-states, as well.  One could argue 
that nationalism could be a limiting factor in cooperation; a different perspective is that national 
security needs among allies could actually promote and even bolster international cooperation.  
Though the U.S. will undoubtedly continue with international cooperation, it appears as though 
national security will outweigh any cooperation if need be. 
3. European Interest, Nationalism, and Space 
ESA is Europe’s gateway to space.  “Its mission is to shape the development of Europe’s 
space capability and ensure that investment in space continues to deliver benefits to the citizens 






of Europe and the world.”75  ESA is currently comprised of eighteen member states: Austria, 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom.  Four other states are also participating under various cooperative agreements: 
Canada, Hungary, Romania, and Poland.76  With eighteen member states and four periphery 
members, common goals and cooperation between these twenty-two entities must supersede 
individual member’s state goals and sense of nationalism.  Not only must ESA exhibit 
cooperation within the agency, but cooperation between ESA and other European Union (EU) 
establishments must also exist.  Throughout the last decade, ESA and the European Commission 
(EC) have disagreed on what ESA’s priorities should be and how to implement these priorities.   
a. Brief History 
The roots of the ESA go back as far as 1945.  Following World War II, European 
scientists realized that national programs would not receive the funding or support required to 
compete with the two superpowers: the U.S. and the Soviet Union.  As a result, many of these 
scientists left Europe to work in one or the other of these countries, though very few went to the 
Soviet Union.  The idea for a joint space research organization did not come about until 1958 
after the foundation of the European common market.  However, by 1960, ten European 
countries had formed a commission to determine European cooperation in space.  From this  
commission, European Space Research Organization (ESRO) was established in 1961.77  In 
1964, the European Launch Development Organization (ELDO) was established separately from 
ESRO.78 
Throughout the 1960s, ESRO established various divisions based in multiple 
European countries.  The ESA Center for Earth Observation (ESRIN) was established in Rome, 
Italy; the European Space Operations Center (ESOC) was established in Darmstadt, Germany; 
and the European Space Research and Technology Center (ESTEC) was established in 
Noordwijk, the Netherlands.  In 1973, ESRO and NASA joined to create Spacelab, a modular 
                                                 75 “European Space Agency,” European Space Agency (2000-2008), http://www.esa.int/esaCP/index.html 
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lab flown on the space shuttle.  ESRO constructed and gave NASA the first module of Spacelab 
in exchange for slots on the space shuttle for European astronauts.  In 1975, ELDO and ESRO 
merged to form the ESA.  From 1975 to 1979, ESA grew by two member states and one 
cooperating state: Canada.  The 1980s saw a continuance in unmanned scientific and commercial 
payloads, as well as the evolution of the Ariane launch system.79  
During the last two decades, ESA and NASA increased their collaborative efforts 
and launched the Solar and Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO), Ulysses satellite (another solar 
satellite), the well-known Hubble Space Telescope (HST), and the Cassini-Huygens probe to 
Saturn.  ESA’s launch vehicle, the Ariane, continued to improve with successful flights of the 
Ariane-5 in the late 1990s.  Most recently, the world has seen the success of the Mars Express 
Orbiter (though the Beagle 2 rover was lost), which was the first fully European mission to 
another planet.  In 2008, ESA launched the Columbus module for the ISS; with this contribution, 
the “ESA now becomes a fully responsible partner in the operations and utilisation of the ISS.”80  
This action also entitles ESA to fly its own astronauts for long-duration missions on the ISS.  
Additionally, “ATV [Automated Transfer Vehicle] Jules Verne, ESA's first Automated Transfer 
Vehicle, [was] also launched to take vital supplies to the ISS.”81  This short history shows that 
without these contributions from the ESA, many projects (HST, ISS) would not be where they are 
today.  
b. Goals, Projects, and Nationalism 
ESA does not operate autonomously from the collective of national governments.  
It is tied to the EU through the EC via the 2004 Framework Agreement between the European 
Community and the European Space Agency.  The EC and the ESA agreed to the following 
cooperative goals: securing Europe’s access to space, ensuring that space policy includes and 
supports policies pursued by the EC, strengthening the ties between ESA and the EC, and 
optimizing European resources.82  The same framework agreement also identified specific fields 
of cooperation to include science, technology, Earth observation, navigation, communication by 
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80 “History of the European Space Agency,” European Space Agency. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Framework Agreement between the European Community and the European Space Agency,  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:L:2004:261:0064:0068:EN:PDF (accessed 14 October 2008). 
24 
 
satellite, human space flight, micro-gravity, launchers, and spectrum policy related to space.  The 
articles of the framework agreement also outline governance of joint initiatives, consultation, and 
information procedures.   
While this framework agreement existed in 2004, a European Space Policy was 
not agreed upon and implemented until 2007.  This policy unified “the approach of the ESA with 
those of the individual European Union member states.”83  Implementing this policy and 
continuing on ESA’s successful path of space exploration requires billions of Euros.  Funding for 
ESA is provided through both the EU and the member states themselves.  The member states 
fund in two different categories: mandatory and optional.  Figure 1 below shows ESA’s use in 
2006 of the billions of Euros it receives from the EC and member states.  Figure 2 is a 
breakdown of member states’ mandatory and optional contributions in 2007.  
 
 
Figure 1.   ESA’s Budget Spending for 2006 in Millions of Euros84 




 Figure 2.   Member States’ Contributions, 200785 
In line with the current space policy, ESA and the European Community 
collaborated to define goals for ESA.  The first of these goals is satellite navigation, specifically 
Galileo, which would reside under the control of the EU.  Another goal of the joint space effort is 
Earth observation, specifically, environment, climate change, and security.  To accomplish this, 
ESA and the EC have implemented the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security 
(GMES) program.  The two remaining goals outlined in the 2007 European Space Policy include 
satellite communications and security and defense.  Satellite communications account for 40% of 
revenues for the European space sector and are “an integral part of the Information and 
Communication Technologies, such as the modernisation programme of the Air Traffic 
Management in Europe.”86  The final goal, security and defense, is important to the EC because 
it allows for monitoring of constantly evolving threats.   
To meet these goals, ESA currently has numerous programs underway and in the 
planning stages.  Within the area of Earth Observation are projects such as Envisat, European 
                                                 85 Luigi Fusco,  Transferring ESA Space R&D to New Business Opportunities. Presentation given to Connect 
Research, May 8, 2008. http://ukinitaly.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3662515/luigi-fusco. 
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Remote Sensing (ERS), Earth Explorers, Meteosat Second Generation (MSG), MetOp, and 
Project for On-Board Autonomy (Proba).  All of these projects are geared toward environmental 
studies including climatology, meteorology, crop forecasting, and marine science.  Finally, ESA 
is also looking to human space flight.  Currently ESA relies on the U.S. and Russia to fly 
Europeans in space.  This leads to discussion of the ISS, where “Europe, working through ESA, 
is exclusively responsible for two key Station elements: the European Columbus laboratory and 
the Automated Transfer Vehicle.”87 
With the elaborate policies, number of member states, amount of funding, and 
few human spaceflight opportunities, one must ask why the Europeans are committed to a 
unified space agency and how national interest, particularism, and nationalism affect this 
commitment.  Are there winners and losers among the members of the respective European 
nation-states?  How does each member state contribute?  To answer the first question of why the 
Europeans are committed to ESA, such cooperation plainly increases Europe’s political, 
economic, and technological clout.  In the technology area, Europeans have realized that “space-
based systems provide improved weather forecasts, satellite broadcasting and advanced 
navigation services; they open up new opportunities in tele-education and tele-medicine.”88  
Economically, space-based systems allow for the growth of communication systems, electrical 
power grids, and financial networks.   
With a set amount of mandatory funding required from each member state, no 
state can accuse the ESA of favoritism toward another member state.  All states contribute the 
same amount of mandatory money, and all have the option of contributing in additional areas.  
With that in mind, each of the twenty-two member or cooperative states contributes through 
various means.  France and Germany are the largest monetary contributors to the ESA, followed 
by Italy and the United Kingdom.  In addition, France and Italy account for 50% of the current 
ESA astronaut core.  An abbreviated table of member (and other) states’ responsibilities and 
contributions is listed below in Table 1. 
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Table 1.   Contribution to ESA by Member 
 Member Responsibilities/Contributions 
Member States Austria Cassini/Huygens, Rosetta, Mars Express89 
 Belgium ESA liaison office; one astronaut; multiple 
programs 
 Czech Republic Various projects including SOHO, GSE 
Land, and CLUSTER II90 
 Denmark EARTHNET, Spacelab, EOPP91 
 Finland Space weather observation, instrumentation 
for mission to Mercury92  
 France Provides launch facility in French Guiana; 
two astronauts; multiple programs 
 Germany European Astronaut Centre (EAC); ESOC; 
one astronaut; multiple programs 
 Greece Cross Scale, Tandem93 
 Ireland ARTES, Galileo, Ariane 5 
 Italy ESRIN; two astronauts; multiple programs 
 Luxembourg ARTES94 
 The Netherlands ESTEC; one astronaut; multiple programs 
Table 1: Contribution to ESA by Member continued on page 29. 
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November 2008). 
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Reports, (2003), http://www.esa.int/esapub/hsr/HSR_33.pdf (accessed 23 November 2008). 
92 “European Space Agency: ESA Space Weather Server,” European Space Agency, 2000-2008,  
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Table 1: Contribution to ESA by Member continued from page 28. 
 Member Responsibilities/Contributions 
 Norway ISS, Ariane 595 
 Portugal Egnos, Galileo, ARTES96 
 Spain  European Space Astronomy Center 
(ESAC); multiple programs 
 Sweden One astronaut; multiple programs 
 Switzerland EUTELSAT, ITSO (INTELSAT) and 
EUMETSAT97 




Canada ERS-1, ERS-2, EOPP, OLYMPUS, Poem-
1/ENVISAT-1, Artemis99 
Plan for European 
Cooperating States 
(PECS) Member 
Hungary Rosetta, Mars Express, ISS100 
 Poland Ulysses, SOHO, Mars Express101 
 Romania COSPAR, INTELSAT, INMARSAT102 
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As with all collaborative efforts, there are conflicts between ESA and the EC, as 
well as between member states.  Many of these disagreements within ESA can be attributed to 
nationalism.  For example, disagreements can come in the form of some member states not 
seeing the need for a certain system, while there are a handful of member states on the opposite 
side of the argument.  One example of disagreement among member states is the Galileo 
program, which began in the late 1990’s.  Disagreements on funding began right away.  In a 
European Policy Paper for the Center for West European Studies, “Transport Commissioner 
Loyola de Palacio argued that the EU Transport Council would be crucial for the future of 
Galileo and she argued for an unequivocal commitment by the Community.  In fact, Palacio 
threatened to withdraw support for Galileo if the EU transport ministers did not firmly commit to 
invest public funds in a timely manner.”103  Despite this warning, the Transport Council 
postponed a commitment to the development of Galileo.  However, the European Commission 
continued to push for an agreement between the EU Council and the European Parliament by 
May of 2001.104  Conflict also existed within the EU member countries, not just within the EU 
political structure.  Ministries and interest groups in France, Italy, Norway, Spain, Portugal, and 
Switzerland believed that the political forces in favor of and the structure of Galileo should fall 
under the umbrella of the EU.  Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UK) 
subscribed to a more commercial argument and pushed for immediate development.105   
Yet another nationalistic/political issue that arose in the early stages of Galileo 
was whether “satellite navigation should be offered through a publicly funded market or through 
a privately funded service market.”106  The share of development funding was linked closely to 
the forecasts of future market value.  Private investors were leery of heavily investing upfront 
with no guarantees of the future of the program.  In addition, “industry has been concerned to 
make a heavy investment early on in a system that would be on the market at the same time as 
GPS.”107  Other factors to consider are the timing of the commercial operation, as well as the 
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interest of industry and its ability “to make a profit from the system from the start.”108  The 
previous two arguments boil down to whether Galileo should be publicly funded and fall under 
the EU or if Galileo should be privately funded and managed, which may speed commitments, 
production, and completion times.  The former countries mentioned (France, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland) see the strategic purpose and value of Galileo, which fuels 
their desire for Galileo to be managed by the EU.  The latter countries mentioned (Germany, 
Netherlands, and the UK) see “a more commercial argument, holding that the development of 
Galileo is urgent because of the need to compete in the satellite applications market.”109 
In 2007, European finance ministers disagreed on funding for satellite navigation, 
putting Galileo on hold.  Previously, the mission had been elevated when EU authorities diverted 
funds from the agriculture sector to ESA’s satellite navigation budget.  Germany, however, 
wanted to see money specifically allotted for ESA to pay for the Galileo program.  However, 
according to Portuguese Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira Dos Santos, “Germany put forward 
that point of view, but was alone in doing so.  There was no support from the other member 
states.”110   
In an interview via Satellite Today, two defense contractors expounded upon the 
political situation surrounding the EU, EC, and ESA.  Ian Reid, president of space operations at 
QinetiQ, a defense and security technology company, stated that “Among the challenges that 
ESA faces (in 2008) are its relationship with the EU, its role as [a research and development] 
organization and its relationship with the European Commission.”111  He also stressed that with 
the enlargement of the EU, there would be pressures on the budget.  In the same vein, Antoine 
Bouvier, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of European Aeronautic and Defense Space 
Company (EADS) Astrium states, “We have in Europe, a political setup which is more complex 
than and not as straightforward as the political organization in the U.S. .… It is more difficult 
here than in the U.S. due to this specific political situation in Europe.”112  In the U.S., only one 
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country is arguing over where funding should go, which projects should survive, and who has 
priority; however, in Europe, you have multiple countries’ nationalism coming to light and 
providing input and arguing over funding, projects, and priorities ultimately vying for jobs for 
their respective country.   
4. European Space Policy and Transatlantic Relations 
ESA is not only cooperating within its own realm and with the EC, but it is also part of 
the largest international space endeavor ever undertaken.  An initial member of the ISS, ESA 
continues to fund and contribute to the ISS through station modules and astronaut presence.  
Europe was invited by the U.S. to join in this endeavor in 1984; after a year of discussions 
between the member states, ESA accepted President Reagan’s invitation to join.  Logsdon notes 
that “European acceptance of the U.S. invitation was an important achievement for those within 
the United States advocating the station partnership. Without European involvement, the 
partnership they had in mind would have been much different in character.” 113  Even after 
accepting the invitation, however, there was still opposition to cooperation in Europe, much of 
which was due to nationalism.  France wanted to take the lead and push for European autonomy, 
while smaller member states remained skeptical; “however, the political strength of an invitation 
from the U.S. President kept this opposition muted in character.”114   
Recently, NASA announced that it would utilize the space station no longer than five 
years after completion; Russia is pushing for a longer life; and ESA acknowledges that it cannot 
pick up NASA’s share (approximately 70%) after NASA’s departure from the ISS.  As 
mentioned previously, if the U.S. departs the ISS in 2015, ESA must decide how to proceed; 
controversy is sure to arise, nationalism could very well be at the forefront of this controversy. 
Despite all of these issues, Europe’s space policy clearly outlines the need for and 
benefits of international cooperation from science and technology research to launchers to human 
space flight.  To that end, the European space policy mandates that the EU, ESA, and their 
member states will “develop a joint strategy for international relations in space by the end of 




2008.”115  Though nationalism will continue to play a role with (and within) ESA, Europe is 
committed to international cooperation for the greater good of space exploration. 
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Nation-states cooperate in high technology ventures to reduce costs, share risks, and 
increase technological advances.  These joint efforts result in new products, processes, and 
services,116 and positively affect relations among those nation-states.  Since the 1960s, NASA 
has partnered with Europe to further space research and exploration for all mankind.  These 
partnerships, however, have not come without growing pains.  The INTELSAT program is an 
excellent example of such pains.  Nationalism pushed the U.S. to expect (and the U.S. eventually 
did receive) a majority of the contracts for this program.  In addition, the U.S. refused to launch 
French satellites in support of INTELSAT in favor of its own satellites.  More recently, 
nationalism is evident in ISS funding and resulting operations. 
Of greatest note is the change in U.S. space policy from 1996 to 2006.  The most recent 
space policy focuses much more on national security and much less on international cooperation 
than the previous policy.  International cooperation is scarcely mentioned, and when it is, only in 
conjunction with national security and protecting U.S. interests.  In addition, the updated policy 
states than even arms control treaty obligations would not hinder the U.S.’s pursuit of national 
security in and through the use of space. 
Since its inception as a collaborative entity in Europe in 1960, ESA has faced many 
challenges.  In contrast to NASA, which only deals internally with one country, ESA is 
comprised of twenty-two member or cooperative states and is subject to oversight by the EC; it is 
easy to see that disagreements will abound within ESA and between ESA and the EC, many of 
which are fueled by political and economic nationalism.  Along those lines, it took until 2007 for 
ESA and the EC to agree upon and implement a European Space Policy.  Not only were policies 
a source of contention, but individual programs such as Galileo, GMES, and the ISS caused 
consternation, as well.   
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Despite internal disagreements fueled by nationalism, Europeans remain committed to 
ESA and space exploration.  Many political, economic, and technological advances take root in 
ESA, and Europeans are not willing to lose their foothold in these areas.  By supporting ESA, 
Europeans are advancing communications systems, financial networks, satellite communications 
and broadcasts, and increasing environmental awareness.  While disagreements are destined to 
continue, Europe as a whole is aware of the benefits of ESA and will continue to support this  
agency well into the future.  The next chapter focuses on five case studies of cooperative projects 




III. CASE STUDIES 
This chapter analyzes historical and comparative case studies of joint space exploration 
projects undertaken by the United States (U.S.) and Europe.  These case studies include the 
following: International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), Ulysses, 
Galileo, Stratosphereic Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA), and the International 
Space Station (ISS).  Within these case studies, two of the three levels of analysis common to 
international relations will serve as an outline for the methodology of this research.  Among the 
areas studied will be the distribution of power, economic conditions, and interdependence of one 
country on another, as well as regime type, politics, and organizational theory. 
A. JOINT NASA/ESA PROJECTS 
Many reasons drove the initial National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)-
European Space Agency (ESA) partnerships including the U.S.’s “genuine desire to involve 
other countries in exploring the new frontier of space.”117  Early on, this involvement came in 
the form of providing ground stations for U.S. communication satellite programs.  As noted by 
Johnson-Freese, “having a local ground station became something of a status symbol in other 
countries.  European countries competed with each other.”118  Throughout the last five decades, 
this cooperation with Europe has evolved from ground stations for satellite communications to 
the ISS.  This section reviews five cases that display this evolution of cooperation. 
1. INTELSAT 
The first case study focuses on INTELSAT, which, in the 1960s and 1970s, was one of 
the earliest cases of cooperation between the U.S. and Europe.  As Johnson-Freese notes, 
cooperation enables the allocation of resources, for example, satellite slots in geostationary orbit.  
One of the first programs to fall under such cooperation was INTELSAT, which reflected “the 
early recognized need to coordinate telecommunication satellite activities.”119  INTELSAT is a 
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global telecommunications network open to members of the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), “a specialized agency of the U.N. [United Nations].”120   
In the U.S., satellite research and development (R&D) had traditionally been conducted 
by the government; however, as INTELSAT progressed, private industry realized the importance 
of gaining a foothold in satellite R&D, as well.  Johnson-Freese notes that companies such as 
“RCA, AT&T, GE, Hughes Aircraft, and Bell Laboratories were heavily involved with basic 
communication satellite research.”121  At the same time, NASA informed the White House of 
the importance of handling international communication satellites in accordance with national 
interests.  In addition, President Kennedy requested an additional $50 million in funding for 
R&D of communication satellites in 1961; it was this funding and the backing of NASA that led 
to U.S. industry’s “capability to build operational telecommunication satellites.”122 
To represent U.S. interests in international telecommunications, the Communication 
Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) was established under the Satellite Act of 1962.  Because of 
the technological advantage of the U.S., many other countries were relegated to either joining 
with the U.S. or being left out of the international endeavor all together.  Because of this strategic 
position, and much to the dismay of the Europeans, the U.S. held the majority (61%) of the 
shares of INTELSAT.  Additionally, many of the INTELSAT contracts were awarded to the U.S. 
in exchange for use of U.S. technology.123  COMSAT’s influence, however, was eventually 
reduced over time, and by 1988, the U.S. investment share was down to 26.4%.124 
In the early 1970s, U.S. nationalism was very apparent.  As previously mentioned, in 
order to protect U.S. interests, INTELSAT resisted the launching of Symphonie, a European 
commercial satellite.  Since Symphonie was seen as competition to INTELSAT, the U.S. 
mandated that Symphonie could only be used for experimental purposes.  Johnson-Freese notes 
that the U.S.’s decision not to launch European satellites was purely economic.125  The French 
perceived this act as the U.S. attempting to “dictate the direction of future European programs 
                                                 120 Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space, 17. 
121 Ibid., 18. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Suzuki, 56. 
124 Johnson-Freese, Changing Patterns of International Cooperation in Space, 18. 
125 Johnson-Freese, Joan,  Space as a Strategic Asset, 46. 
36 
 
through launch restrictions.”126  This clearly was not the solution the Europeans were seeking 
and led to competition with the U.S. instead of cooperation, which subsequently resulted in 
Europe’s determination to develop their own launcher.127  
This international endeavor should have ensured an equitable distribution of power; 
however, the U.S. was able to control the majority of INTELSAT.  Not only did the U.S. hold 
the majority of the shares, but it also was the sole launch provider for the INTELSAT member 
nations.  This is just one example of the interdependence of one country on another in this 
international cooperation program.  Despite this early competition between countries and the 
obvious show of nationalistic policy, INTELSAT has become a success story for international 
cooperation in space.  Before privatization in 2001, INTELSAT brought together “116 countries 
of every imaginable size, economic structure, and political system to work together in a peaceful, 
purposeful, and profitable venture.”128  As Johnson-Freese explains, one of the reasons 
INTELSAT was so successful in bringing together various countries was because the system was 
using technology for the benefit of all, not just a single entity.  Additionally, she lays out two 
valuable lessons learned from INTELSAT in regards to international cooperation: returns should 
be comparable to investment and the return must be greater through cooperation than on an 
individual basis.129 
2. Ulysses 
Ulysses began as the International Solar Polar Mission (ISPM), where the goal was to 
better understand how Earth’s environment is effected by the Sun.  Two spacecraft, one built by 
NASA, the other built by ESA, were to be launched aboard the space shuttle in 1983; however, it 
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Sun.130  Unfortunately, seven years of delays was a difficult way for the Europeans to learn that 
“the U.S. budget process makes it impossible for NASA to guarantee the continuation of an 
international project beyond a yearly basis.”131 
Troubles began in the late 1970s, when NASA diverted $5M from the ISPM budget to 
the test and evaluation budget for the space shuttle.  This prompted the chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Subcommittee to request that NASA delay ISPM by two years; this was the first 
step in a “series of problems … which culminated with the cancellation of the U.S. 
spacecraft.”132  The cancellation of the U.S. spacecraft for the joint Ulysses mission “was an 
exception to an otherwise steady norm and clearly international participation was still seen as 
politically beneficial in both receiving and maintaining Congressional and administrative support 
for a program.”133  While nationalistic behavior is not typically thought of in this manner, this is 
an example of just that.  NASA deemed other national programs (including the space shuttle) 
more important than ISPM (possibly indicating that it was even more important than 
international cooperation), thus the cancellation of the spacecraft.  Nationalism can also been 
seen in the early 1981 telex from Alan Lovelace, acting NASA administrator, to Director-
General Erik Quistgaard of ESA.  The telex states: 
In view of the scientific importance of the solar polar research, we hope that ESA 
will continue with the mission which can now be launched in 1986 on a 
shuttle/centaur and that we will be able to maintain its cooperative nature.  As I 
indicated to you yesterday, the NASA budget will permit support of the remaining 
spacecraft, including U.S. experiments previously planned for the ESA 
spacecraft.134 
The nationalistic flavor could be seen not only in the fact that the U.S. still wanted to be 
responsible for the launcher, but also that the previously planned U.S. experiments would still be 
included aboard the ESA spacecraft. 
After the cancellation of the U.S. spacecraft, NASA and ESA met to discuss further 
action.  ESA stated that the cancellation was a breach of the ISPM Memorandum of 
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Understanding (MOU) and requested full restoration of the program to the level outlined in the 
aforementioned MOU.  ESA also specifically pointed out that the NASA was chosen over other 
European partners “because of the value ESA attached to transatlantic cooperation.”135  This has 
been one example of international cooperation outweighing nationalistic policies.  ESA’s 
response to this meeting was to ask each Member State to protest NASA’s decision through their 
embassy in Washington.  This would allow for multiple protests to be heard, rather than one 
European protest.  Unfortunately, this action did not produce ESA’s desired results.  Instead, 
NASA pointed to a statement in the MOU that clearly stated each member’s ability to carry out 
the agreement was predicated on available funding.136 
ESA continued to favor international cooperation over nationalism; in a memorandum 
presented to the U.S. State Department on behalf of ESA’s member states, ESA urged the U.S. to 
reinstate full funding and participation in ISPM without affecting other international space 
projects.  The U.S., however, maintained its nationalistic stance and did not allow for provisions 
to fund ISPM in the 1981 NASA budget sent to Congress.137  NASA’s response continued to be 
noncommittal throughout negotiations, yet ESA kept a positive outlook.  When the idea of 
developing a lower cost spacecraft was once again dismissed, ESA finally made the decision to 
press ahead with only one spacecraft.  The mission was subsequently renamed Ulysses.      
Johnson-Freese points out the biggest mistake made by the U.S. was not to consult with 
ESA prior to the budget reallocation and resulting cancellation of ISPM.138  NASA exhibited 
strong nationalism when it cancelled an international program in favor of national interests.  It 
could be argued that this funding was required for the testing and employment of the space 
shuttle (without which ISPM would never have launched) since many space science missions 
were being canceled at that time for just that reason.  ESA was aware of this, as well as their 
dependence on NASA to get ISPM off the ground.  Regardless, it is the author’s opinion that 
cutting the funds for a program that required international cooperation was an unfortunate show 
of nationalistic interests.  This, coupled with the overall handling of the cancellation, led 
Quistgaard to ask “the European scientific and technological community not to express too much 
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eagerness for cooperative ventures with the U.S. until the ISPM problem has been solved.”139  
Clearly the only resolution they came to was to launch the ESA spacecraft on the space shuttle in 
1990.  Though this was not the outcome ESA was hoping for, ISPM was eventually launched 
and proved continually successful.  In addition, cooperation between the two organizations 
continues to this day.  
3. Galileo 
The third case study is Galileo, Europe’s precision navigation system that will be 
compatible with the U.S.’s Global Positioning System (GPS) and Russia’s Global'naya 
Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema (GLONASS).  It is the first large program jointly funded 
by the EU and ESA and is also the first major public/private partnership at the EU level;140 the 
EU handles strategic issues, while ESA handles research and development.141  In the 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament [concerning 
the] European Space Policy, Galileo was categorized as one of two European flagship projects 
(along with the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program).142  The 
idea of this flagship program came about when the U.S. made GPS available to the civilian 
sector, prompting Europe to justify the need to enter the satellite navigation community.  The 
U.S.’s GPS constellation was managed by the Department of Defense (DoD), which allowed 
civilians to access the capabilities albeit at a degraded accuracy.  Europe was fearful that the 
DoD would cut off all non-DoD capabilities, leaving Europe at a loss for navigation.  This was 
one of the drivers behind the implementation of Galileo.  As noted by Lembke, “a race [then] 
developed for market share and strategic independence.”143 In 1994, “the European Commission 
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launched a proposal for Europe to engage in satellite navigation.”144  This led to the 
development of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which was to be the predecessor 
of the second-generation constellation, Galileo. 
As mentioned previously, disagreements on leadership and funding began right away.  In 
addition, conflict also existed among the EU member countries, not just within the EU political 
structure.  Germany, Italy, France, and the UK were all competing for the prime contract and 
operational leadership.  As recently as 2007, European finance ministers disagreed on funding 
for satellite navigation, putting Galileo in a holding pattern.  (Previously, the mission had been 
boosted when funds were diverted from the agricultural sector to the ESA’s satellite navigation 
budget.)  Suzuki points out that the competition for leadership in the Galileo program could 
result in two negative impacts: first, if one member state took responsibility for the system, it 
would diminish the “European” aspect of it; second, it could undercut funding for other 
programs if funding could not be spread across all of the member states.145  As a result of this 
competition, as well as numerous budget and schedule slips, Galileo’s thirty-satellite 
constellation is now not expected to be fully operational until 2013.   
Not only were funding and leadership of concern from the beginning, but so was the 
possibility of allowing commercial and private industry participation.  Suzuki found that Britain, 
Germany, and the Netherlands expressed a concern for the commercial possibilities of Galileo 
and demanded participation of private industry.”146 In addition “to Sweden, Denmark, and 
Austria, the opposing countries—Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands—further demanded an 
explanation as to whether Galileo would show financial benefits beyond its costs.”147  This is 
important, as pointed out by Suzuki, because there is limited funding in the ESA framework for 
Galileo, and it would be “crucial to have financial support from industry.”148  There were also 
European countries in favor of commercial and private industry participation, namely France, 
Italy, and Spain.  Lembke points out that these countries “wanted to strengthen Europe’s 
commercial and strategic independence and viewed Galileo more as a public service than as a 
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solely commercial enterprise.”149 To that end, British company Surrey Satellite Technology, 
LTD, built and launched the first Galileo satellite in 2005 (and currently have a project with 
Mississippi State and NASA Stennis)150 and has been awarded a contract by ESA to design 
another Galileo satellite.151   
Disagreement abounds between Member States in other areas, as well, including the 
speed and scale of commitment.  As noted by Lembke, “some countries want a lasting 
commitment at the earliest date, while others want to obtain more information before deciding at 
a later date on the entire project.”152  Those countries that are looking for a lasting commitment 
at an earlier date include: France, Italy, Spain, and Finland, as well as the European Commission 
and ESA.  On the other hand, “Germany, the Netherlands, the UK [United Kingdom] and 
Sweden want a clear role for and commitment by the private sector at an early stage. Moreover, 
[they] opposed the idea of using Galileo for military purposes.” 153  France, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, and Switzerland all stress that “Europe should not subject the Galileo project to detailed 
cost analyses and to the promise of a public-private partnership.” 154  These countries argue that 
a detailed cost analyses and delays in promises of public-private partnership would cause Europe 
to miss its window of opportunity.  Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK agree on the urgency, 
however, they cite “a more commercial argument, holding that the development of Galileo is 
urgent because of the need to compete in the satellite applications market.”155 
In the international arena, the European Union (EU) has been in constant contact with the 
U.S. concerning the compatibility of GPS and Galileo.  The U.S.’s major concern has been that 
“Galileo’s open signal would be too close to the upgraded GPS military signal.”156  If that is the 
case, this could potentially interfere with the military’s use of the system in the event that the 
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U.S. attempted to jam open signals during a conflict.  However, in mid-2007, “the two agreed to 
a common GPS-Galileo civilian signal to allow for interoperability of the two systems, while 
also maintaining the integrity of the U.S. military signal.”157  In an additional outreach for 
international cooperation, the “project has been opened to international partners …  these 
included Israel, Ukraine, India, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea.  Russia has agreed to 
launch Galileo satellites.”158 
The distribution of power between the EU and ESA was outlined in the Communication 
from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament concerning the European 
Space Policy.  The EU would “take the lead in overall representation of applications programmes 
for its policies.” 159  ESA, on the other hand, would “take the lead in the overall representation of 
Europe on programmes in the areas of science, launchers, technology and human spaceflight.”160  
In addition, the document (and its accompaniments) states that the European Commission (EC) 
will conduct the following activities with technical support from ESA: “cooperation with the 
United States (Galileo/GPS-Agreement of July 2004), Russia (GLONASS, negotiations ongoing) 
and other countries relating to interoperability and compatibility of Galileo with existing and 
coming GNSS Systems.”161  In addition, the document outlines that new governance structures 
will be adapted “to ensure the best value for money in the deployment and operation of 
GALILEO, and the most effective involvement of both public and private partners.” 162  Also of 
note is how the document outlines non-EU partners and their participation, stating that 
“collaboration will be based on the principles of non-discrimination and loyal cooperation.”163 
While this case study deals more with EU Member State than trans-Atlantic cooperation, 
it is still a strong case for international cooperation.  Though this cooperation seems to be only a 
small part of the politics involved in Galileo, it is nonetheless a very important part.  
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Compatibility with the U.S.’s GPS system could turn out to be crucial for Europe, as well as the 
U.S..  As previously mentioned deconfliction of frequencies is of the upmost importance and will 
serve everyone well in the event of another conflict on European soil.   
4. SOFIA 
The Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy is another example of transatlantic 
cooperation in space.  SOFIA is a joint astronomy project between NASA and the German 
Aerospace Center.164  The idea for SOFIA came about in 1985 when the NASA Ames Research 
Center was looking for a replacement for the Kuiper Airborne Observatory (KAO), which was a 
Lockheed C-141 equipped with a 91-cm.-aperture infrared telescope.  At the time, NASA Ames 
was “negotiating a sole-source contract with Boeing Military Airplane Co. to determine the 
feasibility of installing such a telescope in a 747SP [Special Performance].”165  Initial cost 
estimates were set at $60M, and in 1991, NASA released a request for a source to provide the 
telescope assembly to be flown aboard SOFIA.  The winning bid went to the German Aerospace 
Center.  With the German telescope and a projected date of first flight set around 2000 or 
2001,166 SOFIA promised “to see stars more than ten times fainter, with ten times greater clarity 
[than KAO].”167   
In the last decade, SOFIA has dodged the chopping block, but has had numerous budget 
cuts with which to contend.  In his statement to Congress in 1995, Dr. Daniel F. Lester (a 
research scientist at the McDonald Observatory at the University of Texas Austin) pointed out 
that:  
SOFIA is a collaborative effort between NASA and the German Space Agency 
DARA [German Agency for Space Flight Affairs].  In this effort, Germany would 
bear approximately 20% of the development and operations costs and, in 
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time.  We have been given strong indications that this agreement may be 
perishable, in that postponement of SOFIA development may cost their financial 
support.168    
Despite this warning, funds were only partially restored in 1995169 even though projected costs 
had soared to $250M.   
Not only did budgetary issues plague SOFIA, technical interface issues did, as well.  In 
1998, interface problems between the German-built telescope and the U.S.-modified 747 arose 
that put SOFIA behind schedule, yet again.170  By the year 2000, the first flight was still 
projected to be three years away, but 2003 came and went, plagued by cost and schedule 
overruns.  In 2007, NASA deleted SOFIA from its budget while it determined whether or not to 
continue with the program.  Yet, again, NASA made a decision independent of its international 
partner.  DLR (German Research Institute for Aviation and Space Flight), “which had spent 80 
million of its own funds to develop and build the 2.7-meter Sofia telescope, pleaded with NASA 
to reinstate the funding, arguing, among other things, that transatlantic space cooperation could  
suffer if the project was stopped.”171  Fortunately, the program was saved when an MOU was 
signed between NASA and DLR; the cost, however, had risen to $600M, ten times the initial 
cost estimate. 
Despite numerous setbacks, the SOFIA project continues.  Initial flight tests were 
conducted in Waco, Texas, in early 2007, and full flight testing began at NASA Dryden 
(Edwards Air Force Base [AFB], CA) later that year.  In October 2008, the first three 
astronomers to conduct research aboard SOFIA were announced, and these observation flights 
are projected for later in 2009.  SOFIA is yet another example of NASA deleting international 
programs in favor of national ones, in this case, routing money intended for SOFIA to the shuttle 
and ISS.  Once again, NASA made this decision unilaterally without consulting international 
partners.  Apparently some lessons are more difficult to learn than others.   
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The foundation of the ISS began in the early 1980s when President Reagan commissioned 
NASA “to develop a permanently manned space station and to do it within the decade. … NASA 
will invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build prosperity, and expand 
freedom for all who share our goals.”172  Europe accepted the invitation in 1985 implying that a 
significant share of Europe’s “space budgets over the coming decade would have to be channeled 
into a partnership with the United States.”173  Thus began the largest and most well known 
international space endeavor ever undertaken. 
As previously mentioned in the ISPM study, and as noted by Logsdon, “NASA’s 
international partners during the preceding two decades had been critical of the organization for 
deciding by itself on the objectives and design of projects and only then inviting foreign 
involvement, on terms largely dictated by NASA.”174  Because of this, NASA approached the 
ISS differently and included international partners in the early planning stages.  Along these 
lines, NASA’s Office of International Affairs was tasked with creating the guidelines of 
international partnerships.  Though NASA was off to a good start, there were plenty of obstacles 
to cooperation.  In 1982, technology transfer requests between NASA and ESA “required the 
issuance of a Technical Data Exchange Agreement under the provisions of the Munitions 
Control Act, which was administered by the Department of State.”175  Approval for these 
technology transfers was not forthcoming, and in late 1982, NASA appealed to Under Secretary 
of State for Security Assistance and Science and Technology.  Ultimately, however, NASA was 
instructed that technology transfers should not occur since the space station had “not been given 
a new start.”176 
ESA’s first big step came in June 1982 when Quistgaard stated “ESA will fund, manage, 
and conduct a first study entitled ‘European Utilization Aspects of a U.S. Manned Space 
Station.’ ”177  Not long after, competition within Europe began.  Independent of ESA, both a 
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French and a German-Italian team were studying hardware products for the ISS.  Not only did 
this spur competition within Europe, but it also diverted valuable funds into independent rather 
than cooperative efforts.  Throughout this early planning phase, NASA was hopeful that Europe 
would cooperate under the umbrella of ESA, removing the need to interact with multiple 
European countries.178   
According to Logsdon, Britain was the most skeptical among the larger ESA Member 
States.  ESA required additional funding from its Member States at the same time the UK was 
cutting its own space budget.  In addition, there was nothing about the space station that 
particularly sparked the interest of the UK in the early stages of planning.  However, by late 
1984, British Aerospace became increasingly interested in supplying automated platforms to 
carry specific instrumentation.  In fact, “Germany and Italy agreed to allocate to Britain and to 
British Aerospace the lead role in the platform aspects of the Columbus program, [which] 
provided the incentive the British government needed to go along with the proposed ESA long-
range plan and European participation in the U.S. space station program.”179 
While Italian support had never been in question, the French were a different story 
entirely.  The French strongly backed Europeanization and were of the opinion that this could not 
happen if Europe did not have its own launch capability.  France strongly pushed for further 
development of Hermes, a spaceplane, but because of the cost associated with a spaceplane, this 
idea was not well received by larger Member States, such as Germany and the UK.  Germany 
had always supported the space station from a space flight and aerospace industry perspective; 
however, support was not as forthcoming from the political sector.  Internal conflicts over 
funding for the Ariane 5 and Columbus programs versus the space station were putting the 
German government in a deadlock.  This controversy, however, was settled in early 1985 when 
funding was split between the two.180 Regardless of all of these aforementioned setbacks, the 
Member States came together, and in 1985, ESA officially joined with NASA on the ISS. 
Although NASA was now partnered with ESA and not individual European countries, 
disputes remained between ESA Member States concerning funding and industry involvement.  
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In addition, Member States had their own views of what ESA should focus on.  The French 
wanted to focus on improved launch systems and European autonomy; Germany and Italy 
pushed for human space flight and close cooperation with the U.S.; the British wanted ESA to 
focus more on tangible benefits and less on research; finally, smaller Member States wanted 
programs that allowed for their participation.181  Finally, in 1989, all members of the space 
station signed an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) and an MOU.  Within these agreements, 
“the partners agreed to provide hardware for the space station at their own expense, a total of 
$8 billion at the time.”182 
Over the years, the funding and schedule have changed numerous times.  In addition, 
there are currently only eight shuttle flights to the ISS remaining before the shuttle’s projected 
retirement in 2010.  If the shuttle retires in 2010, it leaves only the Russian Soyuz as the means 
of crew transportation to and from the ISS.  At the same time as the shuttle’s retirement was 
announced, “the President said the United States would fulfill its commitments to its space 
station partners.”183  Additionally, however, a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report 
noted that “NASA plans to complete its utilization of ISS in 2016 (though the other partners may 
continue to use it after that time).”184  NASA can only continue to fulfill its commitments via 
funding, station presence, and scientific research; it cannot fulfill its original commitment of 
being one of two partners to transport crews.   
Though NASA plans on leaving the ISS, ESA continues to forge ahead in its contribution.  
ESA’s most recent contributions include the Columbus laboratory, Harmony (which connects the 
Columbus, Destiny, and Kibo laboratories), and the Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV).  In 
February 2008, the Columbus laboratory was successfully launched and attached to the ISS, thus 
increasing the scientific capability of the station.  In April of 2008, ATV Jules Verne was 
launched.  The ATV is an automated cargo ship that visits the ISS about every twelve months 
with experimental equipment, food, air, and water.  It stays docked to the ISS for up to six 
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months, offloads up to 6.4 tons of waste, and burns up in the Earth’s atmosphere.185  Future 
possibilities of the ATV include man-rating the system in order to transport crews, not just cargo, 
the addition of a cargo re-entry capsule to return scientific experiments, and even an advanced 
version of the ATV to be used for exploring the Moon and Mars.186 
The ISS is the furthest-reaching example to date of international cooperation in space.  
Not only does this cooperation reach from Europe to the U.S. and other countries (including 
Japan, Canada, and Russia), but cooperation occurs within Europe as well.  As an organization 
with multiple nations as members, ESA deals with unique problems that NASA does not face.  
Regardless, cooperation on this endeavor has succeeded, albeit not totally void of nationalism.  
In the early stages, NASA had a difficult time with technology transfer and European nations 
were at odds over what their role and involvement in the station should be.  More recently, the 
U.S. put forth a large display of nationalism when it announced it would be leaving the ISS by 
2015 in favor of funding missions to the Moon and Mars. This unexpected decision by the U.S. 
will force the other international partners to deal with upkeep and continuing station costs after 
the U.S. departs the ISS.   
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
Many lessons learned can be gleaned from these five case studies.  From studying the 
INTELSAT case, an obvious conclusion is that strong nationalism hinders international 
cooperation.  If a program is to be truly international, one partner cannot hold 50% of the shares.  
While it is true that someone will hold a larger percentage of shares, one partner having 
controlling interest is not conducive to international cooperation.  In the case of INTELSAT, this 
led France to push for development of a European launcher.  At the time, this took funding and 
development time away from INTELSAT.  On the other side of the argument, having the Ariane 
launcher is of great benefit now, not only to Europe, but to the rest of the world.  The ATV Jules 
Verne, which helps supply and remove waste from the ISS, is launched atop an Ariane rocket. 
The second case study, Ulysses, proves that prior consultation with partners concerning 
major decisions is imperative.  The U.S.’s decision to cancel its spacecraft intended for ISPM 
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was not only a strong show of nationalism (clearly national programs were more important that 
international ones), but it proved to the international community that U.S. funding is never a 
guarantee.  That alone could prevent another nation from entering into any type of agreement 
with the U.S.  
The Galileo program also displays lessons learned.  While the international cooperation 
between Europe and the U.S. has been very beneficial, the national cooperation within Europe 
over contentious issues like funding has been less than commendable.  Europe has worked with 
the U.S. (and Russia) to make the Galileo constellation compatible with GPS (and GLONASS).  
The U.S. and Europe have successfully deconflicted Europe’s open signal with the U.S.’s 
upgraded military signal to ensure adequate coverage and jamming capabilities, if required.  On 
the other hand, disagreements within Europe have continually delayed Galileo.  In order for 
programs like this to come to fruition, decisions that impact everyone should be made as early as 
possible, from the role of industry to the funding required to long-term applications of the 
project.  This will not only save time, but it will ultimately cut down on costs. 
The case study concerning SOFIA proves that NASA has a difficult time learning from 
its mistakes.  As in the case of Ulysses, NASA not only cut funding for an international program, 
but it also made the grave mistake of not keeping the international partner informed of funding 
issues or even that the program could be cancelled.  German DLR had invested millions in the 
program, yet was blindsided by the announcement that SOFIA would not be funded in 2007.  
Had it not been for Germany’s persistence and willingness to sacrifice even more, SOFIA may 
never have seen its first flight.   
The final case study of the ISS, however, proves that international cooperation is taking a 
step in the right direction.  NASA realized up front that international guidelines had to be 
established and that all partners or potential partners had to remain abreast of changes or 
problems they might face.  As mentioned previously, technology transfer was an issue in the 
early planning stages, as were the disagreements between European countries on the role in the 
endeavor.  These issues were overcome, and the station flourishes today.  However, not all 
lessons learned have been applied.  The most recent announcement by the U.S. to pull out of the 
ISS by 2015 came as a surprise to other ISS members, not unlike NASA’s decision to cancel the 
U.S. spacecraft component of the ISPM mission.  While NASA seemed to understand during the 
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early stages of ISS planning that communication with partners was important, the U.S. did not 
take that into account when it unexpectedly announced its withdrawal.   
C. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Conducting an historical analysis is important to understanding how to improve 
cooperation in the future.  In the case of international cooperation in space, the historical analysis 
is best conducted via case studies.  Of particular note to international cooperation in space, these 
five cases were explored: INTELSAT, Ulysses, Galileo, SOFIA, and the ISS.  While each case 
was very different in mission, the goal of international cooperation was the same. 
Numerous lessons learned were gleaned from these case studies, with many lessons 
appearing in more than one case.  INTELSAT proved the need for a comparable distribution of 
power among nations.  In the beginning, the U.S. had 61% of the shares and was favoring U.S. 
made satellites, while refusing to launch other’s satellites.  By 2001, however, 116 countries had 
come together to ensure success of the global communications system.  The Ulysses program 
proved the need for open communication between international partners.  When NASA 
blindsided ESA with the cancellation of the U.S. spacecraft, ESA put aside nationalism and 
fought to find a way to make it work with NASA.  In the end, however, ESA resigned itself to 
using only one spacecraft to complete the mission.  The Galileo program has worked well in the 
international arena, with cooperation evident between ESA and the U.S., as well as Russia.  
However, cooperation within ESA has been difficult.  Numerous countries are battling over 
funding, industry involvement, and timelines, leading to multiple disagreements and delaying the 
program by years. Like Ulysses, SOFIA proved the need for open communication between 
international partners.  In this case, however, it was Germany’s nationalism, not lack thereof, 
which pushed NASA to continue funding and enter into the flight testing phase. 
As mentioned previously, the case of the ISS shows that international cooperation is 
taking a step in the right direction.  International partners were brought into the early planning 
stages and were kept abreast of changes.  Numerous nations worked together, sorted through 
issues, and developed quite possibly the greatest international cooperation endeavor ever 
undertaken in space.  This was tainted, however, by NASA’s unexpected announcement of 
withdrawal by 2016.  While progress is noted throughout these five case studies, there is still 
room for improvement when it comes to international cooperation in space. 
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IV. CURRENT AND EMERGING ISSUES 
The previous chapter studied cases from an historical standpoint.  This chapter focuses on 
the issues of current and future space cooperation.  First and foremost is the International Space 
Station (ISS), in which there are currently five partners: Canada, the European Space Agency 
(ESA), Japan, Russia, and the United States (U.S.).  The next step in future exploration is 
returning to the Moon.  Numerous countries have their eyes turned toward lunar exploration 
including the U.S., Germany, China, Japan, and most recently, India.  Finally, the ultimate goal 
of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) is to conduct “human missions to Mars 
and to worlds beyond.”187   
In January 2004, President Bush presented his VSE speech, which called on the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) to “gain a new foothold on the moon and to 
prepare for new journeys to the worlds beyond our own.”188  In the VSE, the president outlined 
three goals: to complete the ISS by 2010, to design a new crew exploration vehicle and conduct 
the first manned flight by 2014, and to return to the Moon by 2020.  The U.S. cannot do this 
alone, however, and the President called on international partners to join in the exploration.189 
With such lofty goals and need for international cooperation, the VSE set off a series of 
meetings, debates, controversy, and even agreements among international partners.  The 
International Cooperation for Sustainable Space Exploration was organized in 2005 by ESA and 
the Italian Space Agency (ASI), which conducted workshops and facilitated meetings of “over 
50 senior executives with responsibility in the field of space exploration from major space 
agencies world-wide.”190  During the 2005 session, ESA noted that while the VSE placed the 
U.S. as the primary player, “several nations can play an active role as partners in an international 
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endeavour for space exploration.”191  ESA is clearly stressing the need for international 
cooperation and further strengthens itself by stating that an objective is to “establish a reasonable 
autonomy for Europe whilst exploiting international cooperation opportunities as 
appropriate.”192  NASA’s stance during this time was to foster cooperation in robotic and 
manned missions (particularly robotic missions to the Moon) and research and technology, 
including technology exchange.193  In 2005, it seemed as though ESA and NASA were still in 
agreement on the future of international cooperation. 
These meetings were again held in 2006, and the push by ESA for international 
cooperation continued.  ESA stated three main reasons for international cooperation: 
“exploration of space is a global programme for the benefit of humankind by its very nature, a 
cooperative approach including several major spacefaring nations will achieve sustainability, and 
cooperation grants access to enabling capabilities, which are otherwise not affordable to develop 
for Europe alone.”194  International cooperation was still at the top of ESA’s agenda.  For 
NASA, however, international cooperation seemed to be struggling.  While it was an objective of 
the VSE to promote international participation in space exploration, NASA still placed itself as 
the primary lead in numerous areas.  As of 2006, the Science Mission Directorate had 43 
missions on orbit, was the lead on 24 of those missions with international partners, and 
contributed to only 14 foreign-led missions.  While this single directorate contributed to only 14 
foreign-led missions, it was a step in the direction of international cooperation.  Of note was the 
conclusion to NASA’s International Cooperation briefing, in which it was stated that 
international cooperation would be present in numerous Moon and Mars missions.  Additionally, 
it was noted “NASA anticipates significant opportunities for international participation in the 
Vision for U.S. Space Exploration.”195 
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Earlier in 2006, however, Taylor Dinerman of The Space Review noted that at ESA’s 
ministerial meeting, “ESA is becoming less and less a civilian space agency dedicated to science, 
technology, and exploration and more and more an institution dedicated to enhancing the power 
and prestige of the European Union [EU], which leaves the non-EU members and associates of 
ESA, such as Switzerland and Canada, in an increasingly uncomfortable situation.”196  He noted 
that this is directly tied to France’s desire to make Europe into a superpower while ignoring that 
“other Europeans want ESA to help provide them with a better standard of living, a cleaner 
environment, and more productive economy.”197  ESA as a whole, however, wants to contribute 
to many different projects and continues to push for international cooperation whenever possible.  
It is the author’s opinion that this push comes from many aspects, one being ESA’s lack of 
comparable funding to more established space programs such as those of the U.S. and Russia.  
Another aspect would be to participate in technology exchange.  With greater international 
cooperation, ESA has a greater chance of accomplishing its own goals. 
In May 2007, The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination was 
released.  It was the result of discussions amongst fourteen space agencies concerning global 
interests in space exploration.  Within this document, it was determined that there needed to be a 
medium through which space agencies could “exchange information regarding interests, 
objectives and plans in space exploration with the goal of strengthening both individual 
exploration programs as well as the collective effort.”198  This medium was created and named 
the International Space Exploration Coordination Group (ISECG), which was not intended to 
replace, or compete with, the International Lunar Exploration Working Group (ILEWG) and/or 
the International Mars Exploration Working Group (IMEWG), both of which will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  This group continues to promote cooperation and technology sharing, as 
well as set standards for the space agencies to follow, for example, a common lunar reference 
system to ease cooperation. 
These are but a few meetings that have occurred concerning the future of space 
exploration in an international context.  The following sections address international cooperation 
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concerning the ISS, as well as missions to the Moon and Mars.  These sections also discuss 
possible technology sharing and coordination between NASA and ESA.   
A. ISS  
As previously mentioned, there are five main international partners participating in the 
ISS (see Figure 3) and many more individual countries.  Not all member states of ESA are 
participating, however.  Those eleven that are include the following: Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom 
(UK).  The concept of numerous partners grants ample opportunity for cooperation, as well as 
for disagreement.  As the ISS continues to orbit, all partners must commit to cooperation for the 
betterment of the station and crews themselves.   
As noted, President Bush addressed the future of the ISS in his VSE speech, stating, “our 
first goal is to complete the International Space Station by 2010. We will finish what we have 
started; we will meet our obligations to our 15 international partners on this project.”199  It was 
also during this speech that President Bush announced the chief purpose of the Shuttle (to finish 
assembly of the ISS), as well as its projected retirement date of 2010.200 
 
 




 Figure 3.   ISS in May 2006201 
The Constellation program is NASA’s answer to not only the Shuttle replacement for 
flights to the ISS, but also for the larger goals of reaching the Moon, Mars, and beyond.  
Constellation is comprised of the Ares launch vehicles (I and V), the Orion crew capsule, and the 
lunar lander, Altair.  NASA projects an initial operating capability for Orion of 2015, with 
missions to the Moon by 2020.  Fortunately, the U.S. has already landed twelve men on the 
Moon and has numerous technologies and historical aspects on which to build.  The Saturn V 
(see Figure 4) was and remains the largest rocket ever built.  This three-stage rocket had thirteen 
successful launches to its credit and zero losses of crew or payload; “nine of the missions it 
launched traveled to the moon, and six landed there. The final Saturn V launch in 1973 put 
Skylab, America’s first space station, in orbit.”202  According to Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, “NASA plans to reuse human-rated hardware wherever possible … [which is] 
perhaps best illustrated in the decision to use the [Saturn V] J2 engine [for the Ares I second 
stage].”203  The decision was made to use the same rocket that powered the upper stages of the 
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Saturn V stack in order to save development time and money on Ares; however, there will be 
major modifications to this 1960s technology.  NASA has warned that the J-2X development is 
approximately a year ahead of the Ares I overall development, which could mean a major 
redesign if problems were found elsewhere in the stack.  However, this lead allows for more 
engine development and testing, which can result in a better design.204  In November 2008, the 
J-2X passed the Critical Design Review stage and moved into full-scale testing.205  Yet another 
carryover from proven technologies is the use of a solid rocket booster, “derived from the Space 
Shuttle Program’s reusable solid rocket motor,”206 on the Ares I first stage.  In January 2009, an 
Ares I-X completed testing in Promontory, Utah, conducting “a full-scale separation test of the 
forward skirt extension.”207  The full-scale Ares I test launch is projected for launch from 
Kennedy Space Center, Florida, later in 2009.208 
While Ares I will be the “people-lifter,” Ares V will be the “cargo lifter,” which “will 
serve as NASA's primary vessel for safe, reliable delivery of large-scale hardware to space— 
from the lunar landing craft and materials for establishing a moon base, to food, fresh water and 
other staples needed to extend a human presence beyond Earth orbit.”209  As with Ares I, Ares 
V’s first stage will rely on solid rocket boosters derived from the Space Shuttle.  The center tank, 
which is liquid fuel, is derived from the Saturn V; this tank will fuel engines that are upgraded 
versions of those currently used on the Delta IV.  Also, Ares V will use the J-2X engines used in 
Ares I, derived from the Saturn V upper stage.210 
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 Figure 4.   Saturn V (During Apollo 11 Launch)211 
Also in development for returning to the Moon is the Orion crew capsule, which will also 
serve as the shuttle between the U.S. and the ISS for both crew and cargo.  Though similar in 
appearance to the Apollo capsule, Orion will be much larger and capable of carrying up to six 
crew members to the ISS.  Orion’s first flight to the ISS is projected for 2014 with Moon  
missions by 2020.  In addition, Orion can be docked to the ISS for up to six months and serve as 
a lifeboat for crew members aboard the ISS.212  Figure 5 depicts the components of 
Constellation. 
Constellation has not been without controversy, however.  As early as December 2008, 
then President-elect Obama requested a study be conducted on how much money could be saved 
by cancelling Ares I and scaling back Orion.  Additionally, Obama’s NASA transition team 
inquired about the cost savings and feasibility of man-rating an Atlas V or Delta IV rocket to 
serve as the launcher in lieu of Ares.213   As recently as January 2009, President Obama 
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advocated collaboration between the Department of Defense (DoD) and NASA.  President 
Obama envisions the collaboration reducing the time-gap between the retirement of the Shuttle 
and operation of Orion.214  In an article released April 20, 2009, NASAspaceflight.com reported 
that “a study by the Aerospace Corporation … has found both the Atlas V Heavy and Delta IV 
Heavy are capable of launching Orion.”215  However, Mike Griffin, former NASA administrator, 
dismissed the finding as unviable.  Of concern is the additional pad and vehicle assembly 
building requirements if an Atlas or Delta rocket is used.  As stated in the article, “a new, 
dedicated launch pad (LC-37A) for Delta IV-H—if required—would cost around $750M, 
although sources claim it would be a lower dollar figure. An alternative Vehicle Integration 
Building (VIB) and Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) for Atlas V-H on LC-41 would cost around 
$350M.”216  Final decisions have yet to be made.   
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Figure 5.   Constellation217 
Numerous countries are affected by the retirement of the Space Shuttle including those 
member states in ESA.  In the VSE, President Bush outlined the goals of “promot[ing] 
international and commercial participation in exploration to further U.S. scientific, security, and 
                                                 217 Peter Orszag, “An Analysis of NASA’s Plans for Continuing Human Spaceflight After Retiring the Shuttle,” 
Congressional Budget Office Analysis (November 2008), 4.  
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economic interests,”218 as well as “pursu[ing] opportunities for international participation to 
support U.S. space exploration goals.”219  The VSE clearly promotes international cooperation 
and directs NASA to “actively seek international partners and work with the space agencies of 
these partners in executing future exploration activities.”220 
With the retirement of the Shuttle comes a reliance on the Russian Soyuz to transport 
crews to and from the ISS for not only NASA’s astronauts, but ESA’s astronauts, as well.  In 
addition, contracting with Russia for the use of Soyuz requires “an exemption from the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act (INA), which banned U.S. payments to Russia in connection with the 
International Space Station (ISS) unless the U.S. President determined that Russia was taking 
steps to halt proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technology to Iran.”221  Congress 
exempted the ISS flights through … 2016.222  According to An Analysis of NASA’s Plans for 
Continuing Human Spaceflight After Retiring the Space Shuttle, the projected five-year gap 
(between the Space Shuttle and Orion) could increase if problems arise in completion of the ISS, 
not unlike the recent delay of STS-119, whose mission was to ferry the final set of solar panels to 
the ISS.  Not only would this create a delay based on schedule slips, but it would also create a 
delay due to funding.  If money is rerouted for Shuttle maintenance and flights, it decreases the 
amount of funding available for development of Constellation. 
In the event that Constellation is delayed, another option for cargo travel to the ISS is the 
SpaceX Dragon (see Figure 6) and/or the Orbital Sciences Corporation Cygnus (see Figure 6), 
civilian equivalents to the Russian Progress (see Figure 6) and the European Automated Transfer 
Vehicle (ATV) (see Figure 6), currently the only ISS cargo transports in operation (aside from 
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Services (COTS) / Commercial Resupply Service (CRS) contract let by NASA.  First flights are 
projected for the last quarter of 2010, but that could be further delayed if the Space Shuttle’s 
retirement is postponed.223  
 
SpaceX Dragon Concept224 
 





ESA’s ATV Jules Verne227 
 
Figure 6.   Various Cargo Resupply Ships to the ISS 
The ATV is an automated vehicle, which was developed in the spirit of international 
cooperation “for ESA by prime contractor Astrium, along with dozens of subcontractors in 10 
European nations—and even eight companies in Russia and the U.S.”228  The ATV is designed 
to ferry supplies to the ISS, dock for up to six months, off-load up to 6.4 tons of waste, and burn 
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up in the Earth’s atmosphere during re-entry.229  In addition, the ATV can perform altitude re-
boosts of the ISS.  The ATV will continue to resupply the ISS, most notably, “it will help fill the 
gap between the end of NASA’s space shuttle operations in 2010 and the start of cargo deliveries 
to the ISS by NASA’s Orion crew exploration vehicle, which may not fly operationally until 
2015.”230  The first ATV, the Jules Verne, successfully docked with the ISS in April 2008 and 
delivered more than 7,500 pounds of supplies including food, water, fuel, and spare parts.  In 
addition, the ATV executed a critical altitude re-boost for the ISS before detaching and burning 
up on re-entry in September 2008. In February 2009, the second ATV was dubbed Johannes 
Kepler, which is to be launched in mid-2010 to execute a mission similar to Jules Verne.  As 
mentioned previously, future possibilities of the ATV include man-rating the system in order to 
transport crews (not merely cargo), the addition of a cargo re-entry capsule to return scientific 
experiments, and even an advanced version of the ATV to be used for exploring the Moon and 
Mars.231 
ESA’s future in the ISS includes a total of five ATV flights, Node 3, Cupola, and the 
European Robotic Arm (ERA).  Node 3 is scheduled to launch in 2009 with the life support 
equipment necessary to sustain a crew of six.  Additionally, it will accommodate the Cupola 
observation module, which will also be the control center for the Canadarm 2.232  Finally, the 
ERA will be “a robotic servicing system, which will be used in the assembly and servicing of the 
Russian segment of the International Space Station.”233  The purpose of the ERA is to reduce the 
EVA [extra vehicular activity] preparation time by allowing easier transfer of small payloads.234  
Yet another possibility for ESA is the Advanced Re-entry Vehicle (ARV), a follow-on to the 
ATV.  When the Shuttle retires, not only is the world losing a crew transportation vehicle, it is 
also losing a heavy equipment return capability.  The ARV could fill this gap by building on the 
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ATV technology and allowing for a safe return to Earth vice burning up on re-entry.  ESA 
predicts this spacecraft, which would launch atop an Ariane 5, could be operational by 2015.235 
Ariane 5 (see Figure 7) is the current heavy lifter for ESA and launches satellites “into 
geostationary transfer orbit, medium and low Earth orbits, Sun-synchronous orbits and Earth-
escape trajectories.”  There are different versions of the Ariane 5, but most aspects remain the 
same; upper stages, however, vary depending on payload.  The Ariane 5 ES ATV version has 
been modified to place the ATV into a circular, low-Earth orbit.236  The Ariane 5 launcher is not 
only the heavy lifter for ESA, it has also been viewed as an alternative to Ares I.  Such an 
alternative could be quite the international initiative.  Michael Griffin had previously proposed 
“man-rating” satellite launchers (such as the Atlas and Delta rockets) for use in launching 
humans into space.  In 2008, Griffin “told French lawmakers that it would be a ‘small step’ from 
today’s French Ariane 5 rocket, which has launched a cargo craft to the International Space 
Station, to ‘an independent European human spaceflight capability.’”237  More recently, 
however, Griffin opposed the use of the Atlas or Delta rockets citing an increase in delays and 
cost, as well as risking safety.238 
Concerning international cooperation, ESA has contracted with Russia to launch a Soyuz 
spacecraft (see Figure 8) from the European Spaceport in French Guiana in late 2009.  This not 
only marks an historic event in cooperation between Russia and ESA, but it is also historic in 
that a Soyuz has never launched outside of Baikonur or Plesetsk.  While this launch will be 
unmanned, the infrastructure put in place by ESA allows for transition to manned launches in the 
future if need be.239  International cooperation is critical to the future of the ISS.  With the 
retirement of the Shuttle comes the loss of a crew transportation vehicle, as well as a heavy/large 
cargo transporter to and from the station.  Only with international cooperation, in terms of 
funding and transportation, will crews continue to occupy the ISS.  However, as recently as April 
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11, 2009, the Wall Street Journal reported that “the U.S. and major foreign partners on the 
International Space Station have agreed in principle to keep it operating through 2020, at least 
five years beyond the current deadline, according to government and industry officials.”240 
 
                
Figure 7.     Ariane 5 Launcher241                   
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 Figure 8.    Soyuz Launcher242 
B. MOON 
President Bush also addressed future exploration of the Moon in his VSE speech.  He 
stated that “our third goal is to return to the moon by 2020, as the launching point for missions 
beyond. . . . We will undertake extended human missions to the moon as early as 2015, with the 
goal of living and working there for increasingly extended periods.”243  The President realized 
the importance of returning to the Moon, not only to increase technologies and further space 
exploration, but also to utilize the Moon as a launching station for missions to Mars and beyond.  
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provisioned on the moon could escape its far lower gravity using far less energy, and thus, far 
less cost.”244  His final statement drove home that “the moon is a logical step toward further 
progress and achievement.”245  
As previously mentioned, Orion is being developed not only for the ISS, but also for the 
Moon missions.  Altair, the lunar lander, is also in development.  Currently, NASA “is seeking 
input from industry experts and is developing conceptual designs.”246  Project assembly and 
testing is projected for 2009 to 2011, with a mission to the Moon no later than 2020.  Prior to 
sending humans back to the Moon, NASA has a series of landers and robotic probes that will 
orbit and land on the Moon to collect data for future missions.  One such probe, the Lunar 
Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO), is scheduled to launch in June 2009, when it will begin its 
journey to the Moon.  During its first year, LRO will be in a low polar orbit “on its primary 
exploration mission, with the possibility of three more years to collect additional detailed 
scientific information about the moon and its environment.”247  Among its missions is to create a 
detailed lunar map, which will help in our understanding of such areas as lunar topography and 
resources.248  In the spirit of international cooperation and technology exchange, the information 
yielded from this mission will supplement data already obtained by ESA and Japanese probes.  
As stated in Aviation Week and Space Technology, “The international constellation of robotic 
spacecraft at the Moon may herald an era of human exploration there in which the nations 
fielding them and others, including Russia, cooperate on an open-ended endeavor to build what 
former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin called a spacefaring civilization beyond low Earth 
orbit.”249  
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As noted, NASA is not the only organization interested in lunar exploration; ESA is 
forging ahead with plans of robotic and human missions with first launch in 2018.  As stated by 
the ESA First Lunar Lander: Request for Information (RFI), 
Coordinated by the Directorate of Human Spaceflight (D-HSF), the overarching 
goal of the European Human Exploration Programme with regards to the Moon is: 
‘to prepare for and conduct exploration of the Moon, focusing on those elements 
key to a future European contribution to international human lunar exploration, 
and to progressively advance our understanding of the Moon itself.’250 
Also outlined in the RFI are three mission goals for the first lunar landing mission.  These goals 
are as follows: “to advance European technological capabilities for future human exploration of 
the Moon, to characterize the lunar environment and potential in situ resources to identify their 
implications for future human exploration, and to increase our understanding of the formation, 
history and evolution of the Moon.”251 
Like NASA, ESA has plans to send probes to the Moon, including Small Missions for 
Advanced Research in Technology (SMART-1), which was launched in September 2003 and 
completed its mission in September 2006; SMART-1 was Europe’s first trip to the Moon.  
According to ESA, SMART-1’s mission was to test “test solar electric propulsion and other 
deep-space technologies, while performing scientific observations of the Moon.”252  Other 
objectives included determining the origin of the Moon and searching for ice at the south pole of 
the Moon.253  As previously mentioned, these respective lunar missions will yield data to be 
incorporated with other agencies’ lunar data. 
These agencies, however, must work together; in that spirit, what eventually became 
ILEWG was formed in 1994 to foster international cooperation in lunar exploration.  In 2005, the 
annual ILEWG conference attendees determined that we need to accelerate our exploration of 
the Moon and that “[the ILEWG] vision is one of expanding humanity into space on an endless 
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journey of exploration and discovery.”254  They also recommended “coordinated spacecraft 
operations and the exchange and integration of data between space agencies … [and] the 
formation of an interagency task group to formulate standardisation of lunar data archives.”255  
Since then, the organization has been championing international cooperation in as many areas as 
possible.  For example, in 2008, the conference addressed international lunar surface operations.  
It is the author’s view that discussions such as these are imperative to ensuring international 
cooperation.  While exact duties and infrastructures cannot be determined quite yet, a reliance 
upon one another can be built such that no one agency can go it alone.  This view is also shared 
by Anatoly N. Perminov, head of Russia’s Federal Space Agency, who was quoted as saying, 
“the possibility of a U.S. withdrawal from ISS suggests the need for ‘more strict rules and 
conditions for participation from the very beginning’ of lunar collaboration to avoid a ‘situation 
when some of the participants will try to leave without taking into consideration the interests of 
other parties.’”256  Along those lines, under the Global Exploration Strategy, NASA developed a 
lunar plan with input from 14 space agencies, including ESA.  Among other themes, the resulting 
strategy included seeking international collaborations.  As quoted in Aerospace America, Shana 
Dale (then deputy administrator of NASA) states, “‘We are completely open’ to new ways that 
NASA and their partners could strike arrangements.”257 
As pointed out by ESA director-general Jean-Jacques Dordain, “Co-operation is hard. 
ESA is all about co-operation. We have 17 states co-operating. It requires transparency and 
trust.”258  NASA understands this all too well considering its history of international 
cooperation; in response, Griffin stated, “We consider the ISS a significant testbed for the future 
exploration of the Moon and Mars, which we wish to jointly undertake with our international 
partners.”259  In that spirit and in a tremendous show of international cooperation, NASA and 
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ESA joined in the first half of 2008 to complete a comparative exploration architecture study.  
This study included the “assessment of potential programs and technologies that when conducted 
cooperatively could one day support a human outpost on the Moon.”260  It focused on ESA’s 
predicted capabilities, as well as NASA’s Ares program.  Per the Global Exploration Strategy, 
NASA is working under an open architecture system that intends to maximize international 
cooperation opportunities.261  While NASA is focusing on the Constellation program, ESA is 
studying the use of an Ariane 5 lunar landing system to autonomously deliver cargo to the 
surface of the Moon, as well as Moon habitation and mobility systems.262 
The comparative study found “a significant mutual interest in the potential development 
of lunar cargo landing systems, communication and navigation systems, lunar orbital 
infrastructures, and lunar surface systems such as habitats or mobility systems.”263  In addition, 
the benefit of redundant human crew transportation capability was reiterated.  In response to the 
findings, Geoff Yoder, the NASA Directorate Integration Office Director, stated:  
Since the announcement of the U.S. Space Exploration Policy, NASA has sought 
and welcomed input from its international partners. …. As future exploration 
plans mature around the world, it is becoming increasingly important that we seek 
compatibilities between NASA’s plans and those of its potential future partners. 
The work we did with ESA will serve as a useful model for discussions with other 
potential partners.264 
Additionally, Bruno Gardini, ESA Exploration Programme Manager remarked: 
ESA is preparing itself to [sic] a round of decisions that will mark Europe's role in 
human spaceflight and exploration for the decades to come. … The Moon is 
surely a [sic] important case study and an [sic] useful test bed to thoroughly 
prepare for more distant destinations.265 
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While there has been much talk of international cooperation, it is the author’s opinion 
that the actual implementation is still in the early stages.  It is true that lunar probe missions and 
the data they collect are being coordinated and shared between nations.  This, however, is a 
small, albeit important, step toward the bigger goal of returning humans to the Moon.  True 
international cooperation may be seen when NASA subcontracts components of the 
Constellation program to international partners, or when ESA man-rates the ATV and Ariane 5 
in order to ferry humans to the space station.  If nationalism is put aside, true international 
cooperation could be realized.   
C. MARS 
The final issue addressed in this chapter is human missions to Mars.  Again, President 
Bush’s VSE mentions these missions, which are to be preceded by robotic missions such as 
probes, landers, and rovers.  He points out the need for a human presence: “Yet the human thirst 
for knowledge ultimately cannot be satisfied by even the most vivid pictures, or the most detailed 
measurements. We need to see and examine and touch for ourselves. And only human beings are 
capable of adapting to the inevitable uncertainties posed by space travel.”266 
The world has had a fascination with Mars since the red planet was discovered and has 
spent billions of dollars to learn more about Earth’s neighbor.  According to Dan Vergano, 
“since July 4, 1997, when the Mars Pathfinder rover riveted the nation with Martian vistas, the 
space agency has spent about $5 billion on Mars exploration.”267  To this end, NASA sent five 
probes to the red planet following Pathfinder: Odyssey, Spirit, Opportunity, Mars 
Reconnaissance, and Phoenix, all of which are still operating and transmitting vast amounts of 
Martian data back to Earth.  Odyssey is mapping Mars’ mineralogy and morphology, while Spirit 
and Opportunity continue to explore the Martian landscape (five years longer than their expected 
lifetimes).  The mission of the Mars Reconnaissance project is to determine if long-standing 
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bodies of water existed, while Phoenix is focused on the geology and biology of the arctic 
 regions.268  Recently, the Phoenix lander found ice at Mars’ north pole.269   
In 2006, Michael Griffin proposed the use of the ISS and a lunar base to serve as an 
experiment for a mission to Mars.  The idea was based on the time it would take for crews to get 
to Mars, spend time on the surface, and return to Earth.  He proposed “stay[ing] on the Moon for 
nine months to a year, and then go back to the station for another six or seven months before 
landing to simulate the return from the red planet.”  This would all occur without assistance from 
NASA “other than what we originally sent them with”270 in order to prove that astronauts can 
successfully complete a Mars expedition.  This would have to be an international effort if not in 
the crew sense, then in the planning and coordination of such a mission and utilization of the ISS. 
Not only has ESA put its sights toward the Moon, it has also invested in Mars exploration 
via Mars Express and the Aurora Program.  Mars Express (with its lander, Beagle 2) was 
launched in June 2003 and was Europe’s first mission to the red planet.  While the orbiter (Mars 
Express) continues to operate, Beagle 2 was lost during its descent to the surface.  Recently ESA 
announced the extension of Mars Express to the end of 2009.  Throughout its mission, Mars 
Express has provided high-resolution, color, three-dimensional images of the surface of Mars, as 
well as evidence of underground water-ice deposits via sub-surface sounding measurements.  In 
addition, Mars Express has detected the former presence of liquid water on the surface and 
methane in the atmosphere, as well as Marian aurorae.271 
The objective of the Aurora Program is to become a space leader in the future and to 
formulate and implement a “long-term plan for the robotic and human exploration of solar 
system bodies holding promise for traces of life.”272  Additionally, the purpose of the program is 
to explore the universe and solar system, stimulate new technology, and inspire the youth of 
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Europe to take an interest in science and technology.  International cooperation is a goal of the 
Aurora Program, as well; not only will the program rely on European nations, but it will also 
collaborate with Canada and the U.S.273  To that end, NASA has become an important partner to 
the ESA in terms of its Aurora Program, funding instrumentation for the ExoMars mission.274  
As stated on ESA’s Aurora website, “the Aurora Programme can be seen as a road map for 
human exploration, from which a large number of scientific as well technology spin-offs will 
emerge, driven by the goal of exploration.”275  Such information would be invaluable to not only 
ESA, but to NASA and the rest of the world, as well.  With appropriate funding and cooperation, 
the U.S. and ESA (and possibly Russia, Canada, or Japan) could collaborate on the largest 
human expedition ever and land mankind on another planet. 
Missions to Mars allow for ample international cooperation.  Such a large undertaking 
could only be possible with contributions from many nations.   To that end, the IMEWG was 
established in 1993 and continues to meet twice a year.  The charter of IMWEG includes the 
following goals: “produce and maintain an international strategy for the exploration of Mars, 
provide a forum for the co-ordination of Mars exploration missions, and examine the possibilities 
for the next steps beyond the currently defined missions.”276  The aforementioned Mars Express 
program falls under IMWEG collaboration.  In 2004, arrangements were made between NASA 
and ESA “to use each other’s orbiters as back-up for each other in relaying data and other 
communications from the landers to Earth.”277  Additionally, ESA intends “to use NASA’s Deep 
Space Network for communications with Earth during parts of the mission. US scientists are 
playing a major role in one of Mars Express’s payload instruments, MARSIS, and participate as 
co-investigators in most other instruments.”278  These actions are crossing the nationalism divide 
and furthering Mars exploration for all partners involved.  In 2006, the International Mars 
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Architecture for Return of Samples (iMARS) Working Group was established to develop a 
possible international Mars sample return mission intended for 2018–2023.  This would be a 
fully international mission, in which partners would share not only the costs and risks, but also 
the rewards.279  ESA’s Exploration Program Manager, Bruno Gardini, states, “For Europe this is 
a major step to shape the future of the ESA Aurora Exploration Programme in 2008.”280  
Additionally, a sample return mission (and how well partners cooperate) will serve the 
international community well when human missions to Mars are undertaken. 
Again, however, difficulties with international cooperation may arise.  Ironically, the 
cooperation of NASA and ESA on outer planet missions is coming at the expense of Mars rover 
missions.  As the cost of the outer planet missions increase, funding for Mars missions is 
redirected.  This leads to “NASA and European Mars managers and scientists [being] concerned 
that … NASA's Mars robotic sample return mission … will be done on the cheap.”281  At a time 
when Europe’s Institute for Scientific and Technical Information is trying to sell Mars to 
Europeans, members of the Institute feel as though they have been undercut.  “Mars remains the 
ultimate goal of …. the VSE,”282 a goal which is strongly supported by both a Stanford 
University study and the National Academy of Sciences.283  This appears to be a Catch-22 for 
both NASA and ESA.  In order to foster greater international cooperation for Mars missions, 
partnerships must be built to sustain less visible missions.  While this is occurring on outer planet 
missions, the redirection of funds from Mars exploration negatively impacts such partnerships. 
In order for NASA and ESA to cooperate, however, ESA members must agree to 
cooperate amongst themselves.  In October 2008, Aviation Week and Space Technology reported, 
“A last-minute about-face by Italy could scuttle Europe’s ambitions to take a lead role in Mars 
and Moon exploration, just as planners are beginning to define a coordinated international 
exploration road map.”284  Enrico Saggese, head of ASI, said “a shift in space priorities ordered 
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by Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi [would] reduce Italy’s ESA contributions far beyond levels 
initially expected.”285  As one of ESA’s top three contributors, this could mean the severe 
crippling, if not the end, of programs such as ExoMars.  In an enormous display of nationalism, 
Saggese states, “The primary reason for the shift is philosophical: [Prime Minister] Berlusconi 
wants to balance out Italy’s spending between ESA programs …. in order to leave more money 
for national programs.”286  Further he notes that Italy will not increase its funding for the 
ExoMars program, even if it results in forfeiture of ASI’s status as prime contractor.287  If this 
came to fruition, NASA could respond by offering up an increased partnership in the program to 
help ease financial strains and the loss of prime contractor.   
The future of manned Mars missions is still unknown; however, international cooperation 
has afforded NASA and ESA numerous probe, lander, and rover missions to the red planet, 
though many still remain fully NASA or fully ESA programs.  The basis for a Mars mission 
collaboration has already been established with the partnerships on the ISS and the intended 
partnerships on the return to the Moon.  It is the author’s opinion that a manned mission to Mars 
could most efficiently be accomplished through international cooperation.  However, such 
cooperation must be fully established and tested via continuation of cooperation on the ISS, as 
well as manned missions to the Moon. 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
President Bush noted the need for “other nations to share the challenges and opportunities 
of this new era of discovery,” and he invited these nations to “join us on this journey, in a spirit 
of cooperation and friendship.”288  This not only applies to the ISS, but to missions to the Moon 
and Mars, as well.  His 2004 VSE speech outlined three distinct goals to accomplish this.  First 
he directed the U.S. to complete the ISS and meet the obligations to our international partners.  
The second goal was for the U.S. to return to the Moon, and finally, the VSE called for a human 
presence on Mars.289 
                                                 285 Craig Covault, “The Outer Limits,” 30-32. 
286 Ibid. 
287 Ibid., 30-32. 




The future of the ISS is somewhat uncertain.  With the retirement of the Shuttle, projected 
for 2010, and the departure of the U.S. from the ISS, projected for 2015/2016, what occurs to and 
on the ISS beyond that time is questionable.  The most apparent issue is the retirement of the 
Space Shuttle, the cargo and people hauler to and from the ISS.  Without the Shuttle, the U.S. 
must rely on Russia to transport U.S. crews.  Also without the Shuttle, the world loses the only 
large/heavy cargo return capability from the ISS.  To mitigate these issues, as well as to 
commence the quest of travel to the Moon and Mars, the U.S. is developing Constellation, which 
will be comprised of an Ares I crew launcher, an Ares V cargo launcher, and the Orion crew 
capsule.  ESA is capitalizing on the retirement of the Shuttle by developing the ARV.  The ARV 
will be a follow on to the ATV, modified and human rated in order to carry crews.  Currently, 
however, this capability is not projected to be operational until 2015, the same timeframe as Ares 
I and Orion.  Unfortunately, this still leaves a gap for the U.S. between Space Shuttle retirement 
and Orion operation during which the U.S. will rely on Russia for crew transportation. 
The second goal of returning to the Moon is in motion.  Testing of the lunar lander, 
Altair, is projected to begin this year (2009).  To pave the way for returning to the Moon, NASA 
and ESA have both launched probes to the Moon, and ESA has also released an RFI for a lunar 
lander.  Most importantly, however, is the recent comparative exploration architecture study, 
which included an “assessment of potential programs and technologies that when conducted 
cooperatively could one day support a human outpost on the Moon.”290  This study found a 
significant interest in development of lunar landers, communications, navigation, infrastructures, 
and habitats, as well as re-iterating the need for redundant crew transportation capabilities.291 
Building on the technology and lessons learned from returning to the Moon, the U.S. will 
set its sights to Mars.  The U.S. and Europe have conducted extensive missions to Mars, 
including five U.S. rovers and orbiters that are currently exploring the red planet.  ESA is also 
orbiting Mars with the Mars Express and has plans for further exploration via the Aurora 
Program.  The opportunities for international cooperation abound.  With a collaboration of 
technologies, funding, and motivation, landing humankind on Mars is well within our reach.   
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Transatlantic partnerships have become integral to the success of modern-day aerospace 
programs.  As with all such collaboration between nations concerning high-technology, conflicts 
have and continue to arise between the United States (U.S.) and Europe concerning joint space 
initiatives.  This thesis investigated multiple case studies of space cooperation between the 
European Union (EU) and the U.S., as well as what this could mean for future partnerships.  
Included in this analysis was the politics of space in a multinational context, as well as the 
potential conflicts between multinational cooperation and nationalism.  This thesis investigated 
the hypothesis that nationalism has been the major driver within the European Space Agency 
(ESA), as well as between ESA and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), hampering multinational cooperation. 
To understand the effects of nationalism on multinational space cooperation, one must 
understand why these states cooperate in the first place.  Nation-states cooperate in high-
technology ventures for such varied reasons as cost savings, a desire to increase the rate of 
technological research and development, risk sharing, and technology sharing and transfer, as 
well as strategic needs for alliance cohesion.  Cooperation in these ventures also results in the 
generation of new products, processes, and services.  If cooperation in high-technology ventures 
is so advantageous to all partners, why does nationalism come into play?  As previously 
mentioned, nationalistic particularism and parochial concerns have been present in the area of 
space exploration since the beginning; for example, the space race of the 1950s and 1960s was 
deeply rooted in the Soviet-U.S. political conflict of the era. 
Since the 1960s, NASA has partnered with Europe to further space research and 
exploration for all mankind.  The most notable case of nationalism can be seen in the change in 
U.S. space policy from 1996 to 2006.  As previously mentioned, the most recent U.S. space 
policy focuses much more on national security and much less on international cooperation than 
the previous policy.  International cooperation is scarcely mentioned, and when it is, only in 
conjunction with national security and protecting U.S. interests.  In addition, the updated policy 
states than even arms control treaty obligations would not hinder the U.S.’s pursuit of national 
security in and through the use of space.  Nationalism can also be seen within ESA, which is 
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comprised of twenty-two member or cooperative states and is subject to oversight by the 
European Commission (EC); it is easy to see that disagreements will abound within ESA and 
between ESA and the EC, many of which are fueled by political and economic nationalism.   
To further investigate multinational space cooperation, five case studies were conducted 
on varying degrees of cooperation in space exploration.  These case studies included the 
following: International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT), Ulysses, 
Galileo, Stratospheric Observatory for Infrared Astronomy (SOFIA), and the International Space 
Station (ISS).  Within these case studies, two of the three levels of analysis common to 
international relations were researched, to include the distribution of power, economic 
conditions, and interdependence of one country on another, as well as regime type, politics, and 
organizational theory.  It was determined that numerous aspects drove the initial NASA-ESA 
partnerships including the U.S.’s “genuine desire to involve other countries in exploring the new 
frontier of space.”292  Over the last five decades, this cooperation with Europe has evolved from 
ground stations for satellite communications to the ISS.   
Many lessons learned were gleaned from these five case studies, with numerous lessons 
appearing in more than one case.  INTELSAT proved the need for a comparable distribution of 
power between nations, while the Ulysses program proved the need for open communication 
between international partners.  The Galileo program has worked well in the international arena, 
with cooperation evident between ESA and the U.S., as well as Russia.  However, cooperation 
within ESA has been difficult to find.  Numerous countries are battling over funding, industry 
involvement, and timelines leading to multiple disagreements and delaying the program by years. 
Like Ulysses, SOFIA proved the need for open communication between international partners.  
In this case, however, it was Germany’s nationalism, not lack thereof, which pushed NASA to 
continue funding and enter into the flight testing phase.  As concerns the ISS, international 
partners were brought into the early planning stages and were kept abreast of changes.  
Numerous nations cooperated and developed the greatest international cooperative endeavor ever 
undertaken in space.  This was tainted, however, by NASA’s unexpected announcement of 
withdrawal by 2015. 
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In his 2004 Vision for Space Exploration (VSE) speech, President Bush noted the need 
for “other nations to share the challenges and opportunities of this new era of discovery,” and he 
invited these nations to “join us on this journey, in a spirit of cooperation and friendship.”293  
This concept is vital to the survival of the ISS and potentially very important to returning to the 
Moon and continuing on to Mars.  The future of the ISS is uncertain due to the retirement of the 
Space Shuttle (both a people and heavy/large cargo hauler to and from the station) and the 
announcement by the U.S. to pull out of the ISS by 2015.  This has left station partners without a 
large cargo return vehicle, one less crew transport, and significantly less funding for ISS 
operations.  To this end, it is important for the station partners to collaborate where possible on 
crew transportation and funding, while maintaining the cooperation present in research and crew 
operations.   
The U.S. is currently developing Constellation, which consists of an Ares I launcher, an 
Ares V launcher, an Orion crew capsule, and the Altair lunar lander.  The combination of Ares I 
and Orion can serve as a crew transport to the ISS; however, it is not projected to be operational 
until 2015, which is precisely when the U.S. has announced it will leave the station.  ESA is also 
in the process of developing the Automated Return Vehicle (ARV), a man-rated follow on to the 
Automated Transfer Vehicle (ATV); however, the ARV is not projected to be operational until 
2015, the same timeframe as Ares I and Orion.  This leaves Russia as the sole ISS crew 
transporter during the gap between Shuttle retirement and Orion operation.  Not only does this 
put Russia in a very powerful position, it also encourages other space-faring nations to focus 
their cooperative activities away from the U.S. and toward Russia.  
The final two goals of the President’s VSE are to return mankind to the Moon and 
eventually have a human presence on Mars.  To that end, both the U.S. and ESA have sent 
probes to the Moon to pave the way for mankind’s return.  Constellation will not only serve the 
ISS, but will also serve as the heavy launcher that returns the U.S. to the Moon and eventually 
land the first humans on Mars.  As mentioned previously, the U.S. and ESA participated in a 
comparative exploration architecture study.  This study concluded that both the U.S. and ESA 
had significant interest in development of lunar landers, communications, navigation, 
infrastructures, and habitats, as well as reiterating the need for redundant crew transportation 
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capabilities.294  It is certainly apparent in ESA’s recent request for information for a lunar lander 
and in NASA’s plan to begin testing of Altair this year.  Following its return to the Moon, the 
U.S. will build on that technology and lessons learned to venture to the red planet.  Both the U.S. 
and Europe have conducted extensive missions to Mars, including five US rovers and orbiters.  
With the cooperation of the U.S., ESA plans to launch the first segment of its Aurora Program, 
ExoMars in 2013.  In that spirit, continued cooperation could greatly increase the chances of 
humans landing on Mars in this century. 
Nationalism has been an underlying theme throughout this thesis.  This research has 
shown that cooperation within ESA’s member states is hampered by nationalistic views and 
ideas, which is most recently apparent in Italy’s redistribution of funds away from ESA’s 
optional programs.  As an agency as a whole, however, ESA rarely allows nationalism to 
interfere with international cooperation in space, even sacrificing national interests in favor of 
cooperation.  By contrast, though it has engaged in some successful international programs, 
NASA has allowed numerous shows of nationalism to hamper some of these projects including 
Ulysses and even the ISS. 
ESA faces a more complex challenge in terms of international players.  ESA itself is 
comprised of twenty-two international partners that must agree before proceeding as a single 
European entity.  Cooperation amongst these partners is not a simple task and has hampered 
many projects within Europe.  The most recent example is Italy’s intent to refocus space funding 
into national programs, thereby compromising ESA’s ability to take a lead role in Moon and 
Mars exploration.  However, the case studies examined in this thesis have shown that once ESA 
comes to an agreement within its construct, it is more than willing to put European nationalism 
aside in favor of international space cooperation. 
On the other hand, the U.S. has allowed nationalistic views to determine the course of 
action in numerous international space exploration ventures; the first being INTELSAT, and the 
most recent being the ISS.  Additionally, the 2006 U.S. National Space Policy is drastically 
different from the previous (1996) policy.  While the 1996 policy mentioned international 
cooperation numerous times, the 2006 policy dedicated only two short paragraphs to the topic.  
In stark contrast, the topic of national security was afforded two entire pages in the 2006 policy, 
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with emphasis on international cooperation only in conjunction with U.S. national security 
interests and the promotion of its own systems.  It is evident that nationalism is at the forefront of 
the 2006 policy and will be a major driver in international cooperation not only with Europe, but 
other nation-states, as well.  The case studies discussed in this thesis have shown that NASA has 
placed nationalistic ideals and goals ahead of international cooperation numerous times, most 
recently with the announcement to withdraw from the ISS in the 2015 timeframe. 
This thesis has not been an all-inconclusive study of international cooperation between 
NASA and ESA.  It is recommended that more studies be conducted before a final determination 
can be formed.  However, the author clearly recommends that future space policies allow for 
more international cooperation, taking heed of lessons learned from past programs.  A future 
space policy can still be focused on national security and the measures required to protect the 
U.S.; however, a more amenable approach to international cooperation would not only aid in 
national security, but also allow for greater space exploration than would be possible by a single 
national agency.  In the future, lessons learned must be reiterated and applied to the maximum 
extent possible, especially those that have occurred in more than one program.  While an 
overarching framework should be established for cooperative space exploration programs, no 
one agency should control the majority of the operation/contracts.  Additionally, the U.S. should 
be more receptive to including international partners when making programmatic decisions that 
affect other agencies/partners.   
While the U.S. was able to land man on the Moon forty years ago, no one has returned in 
over three decades.  However, nations around the world continue to join the U.S. as space-faring 
countries.  These partners can offer each other significant contributions in space exploration if 
international cooperation is allowed to come to fruition.  With tightening space exploration 
budgets and the need for technology exchange, it is the author’s opinion that the ultimate goal of 
landing humans on Mars could be more efficiently realized through international cooperation.  
With international cooperation can come international success on a large scale.  As stated by 
space expert Eligar Sadeh, “Today and in the future, it is hard to imagine that a major 
governmental or commercial space program could be undertaken without international space 
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cooperation.”295  If respective space agencies lay aside nationalistic views, the greatest space 
endeavor of landing humans on another planet can be realized.  Such an accomplishment would 
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